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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND
RURAL AMERICA
ANN M. EISENBERG *
Abstract: Today’s discourse on struggling rural communities insists they are
“dying” or “forgotten.” Many point to globalization and automation as the culprits that made livelihoods in agriculture, natural resource extraction, and manufacturing obsolete, fueling social problems such as the opioid crisis. This narrative fails to offer a path forward; the status quo is no one’s fault, and this “natural” rural death inspires mourning rather than resuscitation. This Article offers a
more illuminating account of the rural story, told through the lens of distributive
justice principles. The Article argues that rural communities have not just “died.”
They were sacrificed. Specifically, distributive justice theories question the morality of public measures that disadvantage discrete groups in the name of aggregate welfare. A critique of legal frameworks shaping rural livelihoods for the past
several decades shows that policymakers consistently decided to trade rural welfare for some perceived societal benefit, violating distributive justice norms. In
agriculture, policies favoring consolidated agribusiness hollowed out oncemultidimensional farm communities. In the extractive sector, lackluster oversight
enabled the environmental and economic devastation of fossil fuel communities.
In manufacturing, trade adjustment programs’ inadequate mitigation of international competition facilitated whole towns’ dismantlement. Decisionmakers
pointed to “the greater good” as their rationale. But benefits for rural communities that would offset these burdens and render their sacrifice “just” prove elusive. This alternate narrative reveals the rural story as not morally neutral, but
one infused with value judgments that determined winners and losers, raising
questions of what a fairer allocation of benefits and burdens should be.
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INTRODUCTION
What happened to rural America and what should be done about it? These
questions have shaped the public and scholarly discourse on rural communities
since the 2016 presidential election and its run-up. Many now realize that
something is wrong outside large population centers in the United States—
something that has rendered certain communities in rural America “forgotten,”
“left behind,” “dying,” “abandoned,” or at least, “resentful.” 1 Yet there is little
consensus about the optimal remedy for this nebulous wrong—for those who
think action is warranted at all. 2
A fundamental problem with this discourse is its oversimplification of
“rural America.” Commentators often focus, whether implicitly or explicitly,
on the mystical land of “Trump country,” where everyone is white, angry, and
a blind supporter of the president. 3 This focus disserves rural communities in
several ways. First, it erases substantial rural populations of color despite the
1

See generally KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT: RURAL CONSCIOUSNESS
IN WISCONSIN AND THE RISE OF SCOTT WALKER (2016) (detailing rural working-class resentment
towards politicians who do not reflect their social values); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND:
DECLINE AND RAGE IN RURAL AMERICA (2018) (discussing rural Americans’ anger and distrust toward the federal government); Steven Conn, Is Rural America the New Inner City?, HUFFPOST (Mar.
12, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/rural-american-the-new-inner-city_us_58c5961ce4b
0a797c1d39e24 [https://perma.cc/9DQP-6ADC] (comparing rural America’s decline to that of America’s inner cities and asserting that “America’s countryside is dying”); Juana Summers, The ‘Forgotten
Tribe’ in West Virginia; Why America’s White Working Class Feels Left Behind, CNN POLITICS
(Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/politics/election-2016-white-working-class-donaldtrump-kaiser-family-foundation/index.html [https://perma.cc/KJ29-FNS9] (describing disaffected
West Virginians who feel “forgotten” and “left behind”).
2
See generally LOKA ASHWOOD, FOR-PROFIT DEMOCRACY: WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS LOSING
THE TRUST OF RURAL AMERICA (2018) (blaming the democratic structure’s enmeshment with corporate profit for exploitation of rural populations); J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF A
FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS (2016) (arguing that white, working-class Appalachians’ struggles
stem from cultural problems that cannot easily be solved through policy); David Schleicher, Stuck!
The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78 (2017) (discussing impediments
to mobility as drivers of rural marginalization).
3
See Nathan A. Rosenberg & Bryce Wilson Stucki, The Butz Stops Here: Why the Food Movement Needs to Rethink Agricultural History, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 12, 12 (2017). The authors note,
After Donald Trump’s surprise victory over Hillary Clinton, commentators and journalists turned their attention to rural America, where Trump won three times as many
votes as his opponent, in order to understand what had just happened. They wrote about
forgotten places: small towns populated by opioid addicts, dying Rust Belt cities with
abandoned factories at their centers, and mountain hamlets populated by xenophobes
and racists. These writers described a conservatism so total and inexplicable it seemed
part of the landscape. Yet the history of rural America reveals a different story.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally Larissa MacFarquhar, In the Heart of Trump Country, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/10/in-the-heart-of-trumpcountry [https://perma.cc/PF9G-LA5J].
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fact that they bear the brunt of concentrated rural poverty. Second, the narrative acknowledges rural socioeconomic decline while in the same breath implying rural culpability for electing a highly polarizing president. This not only
denies the existence of substantial populations of liberal or non-voting rural residents, but also provides an excuse for declining to address rural challenges. 4
The increased attention toward the rural may still seem beneficial for
some distressed rural communities, stereotypes notwithstanding. When commentators ask, “What happened?,” they mean, “What factors contributed to the
widespread rural socioeconomic decline that has fueled feelings of despair and
alienation among certain rural residents?” 5 The most common response to this
question focuses on rural economic marginalization stemming from globalization and automation. 6 Traditional livelihoods in agriculture, extractive industries, and manufacturing once sustained rural life throughout the country. 7
Globalization and automation undermined a substantial portion of these jobs
over the past several decades, including steep declines in the twenty-first century. 8 This loss of a way of life has contributed to modern rural problems for4
See Mark H. Harvey & Rosalind P. Harris, Racial Inequalities and Poverty in Rural America, in
RURAL POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 141, 141–42 (Ann R. Tickamyer et al. eds., 2017) (explaining that rates of poverty among racial minorities living in rural America are two and sometimes three
times higher than for rural whites); Mara Casey Tieken, There’s a Big Part of Rural America That
Everyone’s Ignoring, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
theres-a-big-part-of-rural-america-that-everyones-ignoring/2017/03/24/d06d24d0-1010-11e7-ab0707d9f521f6b5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1ca147eae02f [https://perma.cc/EV34-HBEG]
(detailing how the popular narrative on rural America often leaves out the 10.3 million people of a
racial minority who live in rural America). These rural populations generally voted for Hillary Clinton
in the 2016 presidential election. Tieken, supra.
5
See Ann M. Eisenberg, Rural Blight, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 208–10 (2018).
6
See, e.g., Linda Lobao, Continuity and Change in Place Stratification: Spatial Inequality and
Middle-Range Territorial Units, 69 RURAL SOC. 1, 21–25 (2004) (observing that rural areas are harder
hit by global competition); Christopher D. Merrett & Cynthia Struthers, Globalization and the Future
of Rural Communities in the American Midwest, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 63
(2002); Robert E. Litan, Meeting the Automation Challenge to the Middle Class and the American
Project, BROOKINGS (June 21, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/meeting-the-automationchallenge-to-the-middle-class-and-the-american-project/ [https://perma.cc/9VX8-TJJE] (observing
that automation’s cost savings tend not to benefit rural areas and smaller cities).
7
Thomas G. Johnson, The Rural Economy in a New Century, in BEYOND AGRICULTURE: NEW
POLICIES FOR RURAL AMERICA 7, 7 (Cent. for the Study of Rural Am. ed., 2000), https://files.eric.
ed.gov/fulltext/ED455981.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA32-NDC2].
8
Daron Acemoglu et al., Import Competition and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s, 34
J. LAB. ECON. S141, S141–43 (2015); Michelle W. Anderson, The Western, Rural Rustbelt: Learning
from Local Fiscal Crisis in Oregon, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 465, 512–13 (2014) (observing that
globalization and automation had a greater displacement effect on rural manufacturing jobs than urban
ones); Dirk Johnson, Population Decline in Rural America: A Product of Advances in Technology,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/11/us/population-decline-in-ruralamerica-a-product-of-advances-in-technology.html [https://perma.cc/QL4B-DBPX]; Jennifer Ludden,
Coal Jobs Have Gone up Under Trump, but Not Because of His Policies, NPR (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/23/586236738/coal-jobs-have-gone-up-under-trump-but-not-because-of-
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merly thought of as only “inner-city” problems: a drug crisis, high unemployment, mass population migration, steep drops in the tax base funding local
governments, and a decaying socioeconomic and physical infrastructure.9 One
might think that increased focus on these challenges would help to remedy
them.
Yet, this part of the narrative, too, is incomplete. Globalization and automation are framed almost as forces of nature. They are rarely portrayed as the
consequence of deliberate policy choices; inaction in response to their fallout
is similarly assumed to be somehow natural. 10 The associated socioeconomic
challenges, then, are no one’s fault. With no one responsible, there is no moral
imperative for any entity to act. The “what should we do about it” question
remains unanswered. Indeed, few meaningful policy options have emerged to
address these troubling trends. Further, this issue’s momentousness does not
readily suggest a course of remedial action. Rural poverty, the opioid crisis,
and towns that are literally crumbling can seem like challenges almost too
widespread and daunting to take on. 11 Altogether, the dominant narrative suggests that livelihoods, local governments, and infrastructure across rural America are dying a natural death, inspiring mourning rather than efforts at resuscitation. 12
In order to inform a more meaningful and productive dialogue, this Article challenges the dominant narrative and offers an alternate account of the
rural story. 13 This alternate narrative centers on three main arguments. The first
his-policies [https://perma.cc/2HS3-BZU2] (discussing automation and competition for natural gas as
the main drivers of loss of coal jobs); David Autor et al., When Work Disappears: Manufacturing
Decline and the Falling Marriage-Market Value of Young Men (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 23173, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23173.pdf [https://perma.cc/32T5Q4HS].
9
See Anderson, supra note 8, at 468 nn.12–13; Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 194–99; Alana
Semuels, The Graying of Rural America, THE ATLANTIC (June 2, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2016/06/the-graying-of-rural-america/485159/ [https://perma.cc/8GX6-Y79F].
10
Cf. Eduardo Porter, The Hard Truths of Trying to ‘Save’ the Rural Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/14/opinion/rural-america-trump-decline.html
[https://perma.cc/C86P-CJXC] (characterizing phenomena affecting rural communities as “decline,”
“growth,” and “agglomeration” rather than as consequences of policy decisions or lack thereof).
11
See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 188; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2017
DRUG OVERDOSE DEATH RATES (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths/drugoverdose-death-2017.html [https://perma.cc/22E8-KE3K] [hereinafter OVERDOSE DEATH RATES]
(describing the disproportionately harsh effects of the opioid crisis on rural communities).
12
See Porter, supra note 10 (commenting that “nobody—not experts or policymakers or people in
these communities—seems to know quite how to pick rural America up”).
13
Cf. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1989). Delgado writes,
Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying mindset—the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings

194

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 61:189

is that today’s rural socioeconomic challenges and failures in public services
did not simply result from the passive, benign evolution of economic forces.
Instead, these challenges, whether new or longstanding, result at least in part
from the law’s contribution to or failure to address different forms of distributive injustice, defined as the inequitable distribution of society’s burdens and
benefits. 14
Some of that injustice is more self-evident, yet it remains absent from the
“Trump country” discourse. Persistent inequitable allocations of resources to
Native American reservations in South Dakota and rural schools in South Carolina, for instance, are clear examples of publicly driven racial discrimination
and distributive injustice that intersect with rurality. 15 It is, in fact, not difficult
to establish that rural residents throughout the United States suffer from inequitable allocations of various critical resources. Some of these resource allocations, such as severe shortages of doctors and lawyers, public decisionmakers
have overlooked, while others, such as inequitable education and infrastructure
spending, they have created. 16 At a minimum, these disparities suggest that
against a background of which legal and political discourse takes place. These matters
are rarely focused on. They are like eyeglasses we have worn a long time. . . . Ideology—the received wisdom—makes current social arrangements seem fair and natural.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (articulating a theory of how societies should pursue morally just distributions of resources).
15
Patrice H. Kunesh, A Call for an Assessment of the Welfare of Indian Children in South Dakota, 52 S.D. L. REV. 247, 284–86 (2007); Kimberly Johnson, Verdict Looms for Education in ‘Corridor
of Shame’: Race, Poverty and Geography Converge in the Longest Trial in South Carolina’s History,
ALJAZEERA AM. (Aug. 11, 2014), http://projects.aljazeera.com/2014/south-carolina-schools/ [https://
perma.cc/G3P8-MCPU].
16
See Lisa R. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child Poverty and Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (detailing how residents of rural counties in Montana
are least-served by local government); Anna Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs. Adequacy
Debate: Implications for Rural School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 133, 140 (2003)
(discussing inequitable rural access to education opportunities); Thomas F. Martin II, Note, The Stark
Inaccessibility of Medical Care in Rural Indiana: Judicial and Legislative Solutions, 11 IND. HEALTH
L. REV. 831, 832–33 (2014). See generally Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Ignoring the Rural Underclass: The Biases of Federal Housing Policy, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191 (1990) (explaining that
while thirty percent of poor individuals live in rural areas, rural residents receive only about twenty
percent of federal, state, and local anti-poverty measures and live with higher rates of substandard
housing); Keith Bauer, Distributive Justice and Rural Healthcare: A Case for E-Health, 17 INT’L J.
APPLIED PHIL. 241 (2003) (stating that twenty percent of the U.S. population lives in rural areas but
only nine percent of physicians practice there); Linda L. Chezem, Public Health Law & Equal Access
to Justice in Rural America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 529 (2014) (discussing the public health disparities in
rural communities); Allen S. Hammond, The FCC’s Third Report on Broadband Deployment: Inequitable, Untimely and Unreasonable, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 539, 548 (2002) (discussing the
inequitable distribution of broadband services to rural and inner-city communities); Katherine Porter,
Going Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 969 (offering an
empirical analysis that suggests that rural families face more economic hardship than their urban
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today’s discourse on rural communities requires a more robust exploration of
how distributional decisions shape rural conditions and whether those decisions are “just,” an exploration that this Article offers. 17
The Article’s second argument focuses more directly on the rural socioeconomic decline that has garnered attention of late, and on a subtler version of
distributive injustice that is also absent from the current discourse. This argument is that unacknowledged utilitarianism—a form of distributive injustice in
which the majority makes discrete populations worse off in the name of helping “everyone”—has also contributed to today’s rural challenges. 18 This argument does not dispute globalization and automation’s role in rural decline. Rather, it critiques the legal frameworks that have shaped rural livelihoods in the
agriculture, resource extraction, and manufacturing sectors for the past several
decades. This critique shows that, time and again, public decisionmakers traded rural welfare for some perceived collective benefit. Through their efforts to
make society’s pie of benefits larger, public decisionmakers reduced the size of
the rural slice, raising the question of whether this redistribution was “just.”
Legal and policy developments in these three sectors reveal this pattern of
undermining rural people and places for at least nominal societal benefit. In the
farming sector, President Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, championed a novel vision of agriculture as “a highly profitable commodity for a
handful of . . . producers and processers.” 19 After this vision became more
mainstream, the displacement of family farms and the rise of legal regimes
friendly to polluting agribusiness continued to undercut small operations that
had more symbiotic relationships with communities and neighbors. 20 Even
counterparts); Lisa R. Pruitt et al., Legal Deserts: A Multi-State Perspective on Rural Access to Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2018) [hereinafter Pruitt et al., Legal Deserts] (discussing the
lack of legal resources in rural areas).
17
Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2018)
(arguing that “important welfare-enhancing regulations” are likely to be derailed in the future if policymakers continue “[i]gnoring the pleas of communities that disproportionately suffer serious
harms”).
18
See Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1061–62
(2003) (defining utilitarianism as the principle that distributive decisions should lead to “the greatest
good for the greatest number”); Revesz, supra note 17, at 1491 (discussing widespread acceptance of
the idea that legal rules should focus on “increasing the size of the pie (maximizing net benefits), and
not the size of each slice (distribution),” while explaining that such a view does not necessarily mean
distributional concerns are unimportant).
19
Bekah Mandell, Feasts of Oz: Class, Food, and the Rise of Global Capitalism, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 93, 101 (2010); see Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 17–18 (observing that Butz is
often inaccurately credited with implementing consolidation-friendly programs—such as ending production control for corn and urging farmers to “get big or get out”—when in fact earlier directors of
the USDA started them).
20
JOEL DYER, HARVEST OF RAGE: WHY OKLAHOMA CITY IS ONLY THE BEGINNING 13, 17, 70,
112–14 (1997); Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 19.
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since the displacement of small farmers reached “crisis” level in the 1980s,
state and federal policymakers have consistently favored consolidation and
industrialization. These trends reduced the number of farms, the number of
farm jobs, and local residents’ ability to influence land use decisions—
weakening farm communities and devolving them into mere staging grounds
for often hazardous industrial activity. 21 Yet, these measures have been justified by “the greater good.” Small farms are “inefficient,” while industrialized
agriculture can purportedly “feed the world.” 22
In the extractive sector, for much of the twentieth century, the environmental and socioeconomic devastation associated with coal mining was addressed with only anemic reforms in measures such as the lackluster Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act.23 As damaging as an extractive economy
was, it provided a form of sustenance. But after using rural communities for
cheap, reliable energy, public actors failed to respond to the foreseeable decline of extractive jobs even as they encouraged a transition towards more efficient and cleaner energy production. This left communities with little to show
for their decades-long contribution to the nation’s energy grid. 24
In manufacturing, plant closures fell harder on rural communities because
of their more limited economies. 25 Measures to mitigate mass layoffs came
reluctantly in response to demands by betrayed laborers. Yet, these measures,
such as the Trade Act of 1974 and the Worker Adjustment Retraining and Noti21

See Jonathan W. Coppess, High Cotton and the Low Road: An Unraveling Farm Bill Coalition
and Its Implications, 23 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 353, 370 (2018) (discussing how farm consolidation has
increased since the farm crisis of the 1980s); Neil D. Hamilton, Harvesting the Law: Personal Reflections on Thirty Years of Change in Agricultural Legislation, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 563, 567 (2013)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Harvesting the Law] (describing the “Big Ag” period characterizing the 1980s
to the present, with some present-day evolution toward food localism, as with Community-Supported
Agriculture programs); Neil D. Hamilton, Myth Making in the Heartland—Did Agriculture Elect the
New President?, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 5, 10 (2017) [hereinafter Hamilton, Myth Making]
(“[S]tructural shifts—in land tenure, farm consolidation and livestock production—are often facilitated by public programs such as farm income support, crop insurance, the RFS, and farm lending practices.”); Mandell, supra note 19, at 101–02 (“[Secretary Butz’s focus] on the mechanization, industrialization, and commoditization of agriculture required larger investments in capital than traditional
farming. The increasing need to invest heavily in equipment, fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides in
order to stay competitive meant that only farmers with access to capital could remain competitive
under the new system.”); Merrett & Struthers, supra note 6, at 36.
22
See Neil D. Hamilton, Moving Toward Food Democracy: Better Food, New Farmers, and the
Myth of Feeding the World, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 117, 121 (2011).
23
Patrick McGinley, Collateral Damage: Turning a Blind Eye to Environmental and Social Injustice in the Coalfields, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 304, 330, 422 (2013).
24
Ann Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 300–08 (2019); Revesz, supra note
17, at 1543–55.
25
Anderson, supra note 8, at 465–68; see Revesz, supra note 17, at 1498 (“Our regulatory system
has grappled for almost a half century with the question of how to deal with regulations that displace
workers in communities where there are few other employment options.”).
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fication Act of 1988, failed to adequately mitigate losses imposed on workers
and communities. 26 Meanwhile, the subsequent proliferation of rural blight—
with emptying communities hampered by widespread property vacancy and
abandonment—has largely gone unaddressed. 27 Like in the agricultural and
extractive sectors, the reduction of trade restrictions, with minimal mitigation
measures for affected individuals and communities, were justified by collective
benefits: a higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and greater consumer access
to cheaper goods. 28
Developments in each of these sectors—from small farms to industrialized ones, from the use of fossil fuels to their decline, and from manufacturing
jobs to outsourcing—have been justified by aggregate benefits: respectively,
cheap energy then clean energy, cheap and abundant food, and cheap goods
and a higher GDP. 29 The rural America in decline did not just “die.” By bearing disproportionate economic losses alongside substantial environmental burdens—rationalized in the name of collective welfare—these communities were
sacrificed. 30
It might be argued that concentrating losses and burdens on certain populations is an inevitable part of a functioning society. 31 The problem is that legal
theorists and philosophers widely consider utilitarian rationales for suffering to
be ethically repugnant. 32 According to distributive justice theorists, measures
that impose burdens on discrete groups in the name of aggregate welfare should
be treated with strong skepticism. 33 Although benefits that offset the burdens—
such as rural residents’ joint enjoyment of cheap or clean energy, cheap food,
26

Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America’s Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1868 (1993).
27
See generally Eisenberg, supra note 5 (discussing proliferation of rural property vacancy, dilapidation, and lack of attention to the issue from scholarship, public commentary, and policymakers).
28
See discussion infra Part III.B.
29
See infra notes 207–320.
30
See Porter, supra note 10 (describing rural economic decline of past quarter century as “relentless” and reflective of an “intensifying ruralization of distress”).
31
Cf. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 4, 7 (2003) (observing that society must be able to “revise and update rules” in the public welfare); Kaswan, supra
note 18, at 1062 (arguing that distributive justice does not require “strict equality”); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation”
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1967) (recognizing the constitutional distinction between valid
exercise of police power for which a person bears losses by being “regulated,” versus compensable
injuries for loss of property in the public name).
32
See RAWLS, supra note 14, at 14 (utilitarianism is “inconsistent with the idea of reciprocity
implicit in the notion of a well-ordered society”); Kaswan, supra note 18, at 1062; Michelman, supra
note 31, at 1166 (discussing wide recognition of the injustice inherent in the expectation that “one
man should [. . . be compelled to die] for the people”) (alteration in original).
33
Michelman, supra note 31, at 1174; see Joseph L. Sax, Do Communities Have Rights? The
National Parks as a Laboratory of New Ideas, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 499, 510–11 (1984) (discussing
ethical tensions surrounding local subordination to national interests).
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and cheap goods—might render rural sacrifices just, it is not clear that the most
affected rural communities have had any losses offset.34 What is the demise of
an entire town worth, after all?35
The discussion’s third argument follows once distributive injustice and
majoritarian utilitarianism are established as contributors to rural challenges.
Because rural inequity is a collective problem, the onus falls on society as a
whole to address today’s rural marginalization. 36 To avoid past mistakes—
recreating arbitrary or cruel choices about winners and losers, or embracing the
trap of utilitarian thinking—the clearest solution to addressing rural challenges
is a more robust approach to societal inequity in general. This includes ensuring access to decent work and decent environments for all. These measures are
captured in part in federal policy proposals such as the Green New Deal, a potential “massive program of investments in clean-energy jobs and infrastructure, meant to transform not just the energy sector, but the entire economy.” 37
Such legislation, designed “to make [the economy] fairer and more just,”
would chip away at persistent rural poverty, make the loss of traditional livelihoods somewhat less devastating, and potentially help offset localized environmental hazards.38 These protections are urgent needs for urban communities
treated inequitably, as well. 39
34
See generally Michelman, supra note 31 (discussing the prospect that adequately providing
offsetting benefits to “losers” in allocative decisions might “induce losers to quit their objections to
the change”).
35
Cf. Anderson, supra note 8, at 499–500 (contemplating innate and practical values to facilitating a
rural way of life); Alana Semuels, Ghost Towns of the 21st Century, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/ghost-towns-of-the-21st-century/411343/ [https://
perma.cc/92HN-V5N7] (discussing the proliferation of rural ghost towns as a result of deindustrialization).
36
This Article presumes that the idea of collective responsibility “makes sense as a form of moral
responsibility.” Collective Responsibility, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/X85C-2T3C]. Defenders of this
idea argue “that we blame groups all the time in practice and . . . in a way that is difficult to analyze
with the precepts of methodological individualism”; that “within our practices of moral responsibility
. . . groups have the ability of moral address and exhibit moral competence”; and that linguistic analyses, existentialist traditions, and social theory suggest that it is possible to ascribe group blame. Id.
37
David Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, VOX (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.vox.com/
energy-and-environment/2018/12/21/18144138/green-new-deal-alexandria-ocasio-cortez [https://perma.
cc/F2JX-BMJ3]; see Brigham Daniels et al., Just Environmentalism, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9
(2018) (discussing a need to account for more varied forms of distributive injustice in environmental
decision making than those traditionally considered).
38
See Lisa Archer, Opinion, Green New Deal Must Transform Our Food System to Save Our
Climate, FOOD TANK (Feb. 2019), https://foodtank.com/news/2019/02/opinion-green-new-deal-musttransform-our-food-system-to-save-our-climate/ [https://perma.cc/D2CB-9XRN] (arguing that the
Green New Deal would help address rural poverty by promoting organic, sustainable farming over
industrialized agriculture); Roberts, supra note 37.
39
See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273 (2003) (discussing different
types of challenges facing urban and rural communities).
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The discussion finishes with brief consideration of better-tailored approaches to rural marginalization. 40 The first step is for policymakers to recognize that rural communities warrant equitable treatment and are not merely
means to collective ends. Policymakers should coordinate more with rural residents themselves to better understand their needs. 41 Efforts to address rural
poverty should be re-energized. For communities in decline, local governments
have important, under-discussed potential for rural reform. They are well positioned to serve as vehicles for more robust community economic development—or at least for better-managed decline. 42 Yet, one is hard-pressed to
avoid the conclusion that the remedy to distributive injustice is distributive
justice; the desire for a resource-free solution is unrealistic. Policy choices and
neglectful inaction have contributed to disproportionately low rates of resources per capita directed to rural residents, undercut traditional livelihoods,
and undermined public services. Policymakers must thus ensure a more equitable allocation of society’s benefits and burdens to rural communities in need.
Skeptics of this narrative and these solutions will raise several questions.
First, is it possible to generalize about rural challenges despite rural variability
in residents’ race, class, and region? 43 Second, in light of rural voters’ disproportionate power in bodies such as the U.S. Senate and the electoral college,
can they experience inequity, and do they even want help?44 Third, even if
40
For a more in-depth discussion, see Ann M. Eisenberg, Economic Regulation and Rural America (working draft on file with author).
41
See Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159, 159–60 (2006) (discussing courts’
urban-centric decision making that tends to view rurality through a lens of nostalgia for an idyllic,
stereotyped past); Jean Hardy, How Rural America Is Saving Itself, CITYLAB (Dec. 20, 2018), https://
www.citylab.com/perspective/2018/12/rural-america-us-economic-future-new-york-times-wrong/
578740/ [https://perma.cc/D66L-BKTZ] (“The insistence that no one out there knows how to solve
problems of the rural economy is a false and misleading one. There are decades of research that have
identified paths forward that rural communities are already following and flourishing on.”).
42
See Anderson, supra note 8, at 501; cf. Noah Smith, Opinion, How to Save the Troubled American Heartland, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-0803/how-to-save-the-troubled-american-heartland [https://perma.cc/ZYV6-YXDV] (arguing that not
every rural place can be revitalized, but a strategic allocation of local government resources can help
those places poised to recover). See generally Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched
Thin: Access to Justice in Rural America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2014) (discussing rural residents’
difficulties accessing basic services); Hardy, supra note 41 (arguing that state legislatures have underfunded rural localities in the first part of the 21st century, resulting in a less talented work-force in
those communities, crumbling local infrastructure, and insufficient funding for local school systems).
43
Cf. Pruitt & Showman, supra note 42, at 475 (discussing the adage that “if you’ve seen one
rural place, you’ve seen one rural place”).
44
See Emily Badger, As American as Apple Pie? The Rural Vote’s Disproportionate Slice of
Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/upshot/as-american-asapple-pie-the-rural-votes-disproportionate-slice-of-power.html [https://perma.cc/Z7GC-B6DX] (detailing how “rural America, even as it laments its economic weakness, retains vastly disproportionate
electoral strength”).
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most rural residents want more government intervention, would such interventions not be prohibitively costly? Finally, is the burden on society to rectify
this problem, or should rural residents just move to more livable environs?
These concerns are addressed throughout this Article. Of course, it is difficult to characterize all of “rural America”—a geographic label encompassing
seventy-five percent of the nation’s land and between fifteen to twenty percent
of its people. 45 But this Article insists that it is worth looking for common
themes in the rural experience and to redirect this conversation. The fact remains that most people, including academics and journalists, live in cities and
remain uninitiated to rural challenges. These challenges are central to understanding today’s politics, disputes like those seen at Standing Rock, and the
daily quality of life for those of us who enjoy cheap energy, food, and goods.46
It is hoped that the subsequent analysis will capture diverse rural experiences—encompassing not just the mythic “Trump country,” but also those who
lost cotton mill jobs in African-American communities in the South, coal jobs
in Native-American communities in the West, and farmland in diverse places,
while also bearing burdens of widespread blight and the hazards of unsustainable agribusiness and natural resource extraction. 47
This Article’s alternate narrative at least partially answers the two questions above—what happened to rural America and what should be done about
it?—in more illuminating terms than the dominant discourse’s resignation to
rural America’s natural death. This narrative illustrates that although rural marginalization is complex, its contours are finite and comprehensible, and there is
45

See Kenneth M. Johnson, Where Is Rural America and Who Lives There?, in RURAL POVERTY
IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at 3, 3 (explaining that “rural America is a simple term describing a remarkably diverse collection of people and places”). Over fifty million Americans live in areas
defined as rural. Id.
46
Cf. Daniel T. Lichter & David L. Brown, The New Rural-Urban Interface: Lessons for Higher
Education, 29 CHOICES 1, 1 (2014) (asserting that the question of how rural America can reverse its
decline “seems hardly a priority for most Americans living in big cities and suburbs; they often know
little or nothing about day-to-day life in small towns or in the countryside”).
47
See generally DYER, supra note 20 (discussing widespread displacement of farmers and hazards of industrialized agriculture); Judy Bainbridge, How Black Workers Changed the Textile Industry
in South Carolina, GREENVILLE NEWS (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/
news/2018/10/29/how-black-workers-changed-textile-industry-south-carolina/1798644002/ [https://
perma.cc/Q7EM-HLUK] (discussing black workers’ significant contribution to South Carolina’s textile industry in the 1970s, and the mass layoffs that followed in the 1980s due to increased automation
and cheap labor abroad); Joe Rigert, Letter to the Editor, Native Americans and Coal: The Risks of
Dependency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/opinion/nativeamericans-and-coal-the-risks-of-dependency.html [https://perma.cc/SP5Z-C3ZH] (pointing out the
risk Native-American tribes run in depending on coal industry); Claire E. Jamieson, Change in the
Textile Mill Villages of South Carolina’s Upstate During the Modern South Era 3 (May 2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Tennessee), https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1298&context=utk_gradthes [https://perma.
cc/2UGP-V952] (detailing how a loss of mill jobs has “transformed” southern textile towns).

2020]

Distributive Justice and Rural America

201

a normative case for addressing it through law. It reveals that the rural story is
not morally neutral but infused with value judgments that determine winners
and losers. It also shows that our concepts of potential solutions—or lack
thereof—are shaped by value judgments, rather than by forces of nature. At the
very least, this narrative insists that we must all grapple with these difficult
questions rather than leaving them to the purview of technocrats, political agitators, or struggling small-town governments. To not do so risks further injustice and deepening the urban-rural polarization that threatens the fabric of national democracy. 48
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the communities this Article contemplates, differentiating between a rural America burdened with chronic poverty and a rural America burdened with socioeconomic
decline.49 Part II discusses various theories of distributive justice and their under-explored relevance to the rural condition.50 Part III.A argues that disparities
in resource allocations between urban and rural communities are an instance of
distributive injustice, with those disparities falling harder on chronically impoverished communities. 51 Part III.B critiques legal frameworks that have shaped
key rural livelihoods for the past several decades and argues that policymakers’
majoritarian-utilitarian treatment of rural livelihoods also effectuated distributive
injustice, with these developments affecting communities in decline more poignantly. 52 Part IV offers preliminary contemplation of solutions. 53
I. UNDERSTANDING TODAY’S RURAL LANDSCAPE
This Part provides a broad overview of modern rural America and the
problems its residents face. Section A differentiates among four categories of
48

Cf. Lee Drutman, We Need Political Parties. But Their Rabid Partisanship Could Destroy
American Democracy., VOX (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/9/5/16227700/
hyperpartisanship-identity-american-democracy-problems-solutions-doom-loop [https://perma.cc/
8RUJ-P4CM] (discussing an American political partisanship increasingly characterized in terms of the
“urban/rural partisan divide” and “separate tribal epistemologies”). Rural or white working-class
“economic anxiety” is sometimes framed as a driver of politics that is mutually exclusive with racism
or xenophobia as political drivers. By acknowledging rural inequity, this Article is not intended to
suggest that racism and xenophobia are not also urgent problems in today’s political landscape. This
discussion also does not attempt to discern or explain rural Trump voters’ motivations, although such
connections may surface. Cf. Tyler T. Reny et al., Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: How Racial
and Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explain Shifts in White Voting, 83 PUB. OPINION Q. 91, 91
(2019) (seeking to explain whether “immigration and racial attitudes or economic dislocation and
marginality” were greater causes of the white working class’s “vote switching” in the 2016 election).
49
See infra notes 54–134 and accompanying text.
50
See infra notes 135–179 and accompanying text.
51
See infra notes 186–202 and accompanying text.
52
See infra notes 203–320 and accompanying text.
53
See infra notes 321–332 and accompanying text.
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economic trends that capture the bulk of what today’s rural communities are
experiencing. 54 Section B discusses chronic rural poverty specifically. 55 Section C provides an overview of the transformation of the rural economy over
the past century. 56 Finally, Section D establishes rurality as an intersectional
concept that interacts with other bases of marginalization, such as race, gender,
age, national origin, and class. 57
A. Differentiating the Four Rural Americas
To understand rural communities in the United States, it is important to
understand basic characteristics of urban-rural relations that typically occupy
scholars outside the legal field. Urban and rural communities are interdependent; some even challenge the idea that they should be considered distinguishable types of places. 58 Yet, rural communities tend to be the locus for certain
productive activities. Farming, natural resource extraction, energy production,
forestry, and outdoor recreation necessarily take place predominantly in rural
communities. 59 Urban communities depend upon these rural activities. At the
same time, rural communities depend on urban communities for other benefits,
such as recreation-seeking tourists and peripheral economic effects from large
urban labor markets through regional diffusion of wealth, information, and
work opportunities. 60 Global trends suggest these relationships may be fundamentally evolving as urbanization intensifies around the world. 61 But rural
populations persist and likely will into the future. 62
A common question is how “rural” should be defined. Most agree that a
spectrum best characterizes differing types of populations and landscapes, with
extreme urbanity on the one end and extreme rurality on the other. 63 Formal
54

See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text.
56
See infra notes 81–121 and accompanying text.
57
See infra notes 122–134 and accompanying text.
58
Daniel T. Lichter & James P. Ziliak, The Rural-Urban Interface: New Patterns of Spatial Interdependence and Inequality in America, 672 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 9 (2017).
59
Id. at 8.
60
Id. at 8, 17–18.
61
See generally GLOBAL URBANIZATION (Eugenie L. Birch & Susan M. Wachter eds., 2011).
62
Cf. Christopher Ingraham, Americans Say There’s Not Much Appeal to Big-City Living. Why
Do So Many of Us Live There?, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2018/12/18/americans-say-theres-not-much-appeal-big-city-living-why-do-so-many-us-livethere/ [https://perma.cc/Q6GD-A6HE] (discussing a poll showing that a plurality of Americans would
prefer to live in a rural area over a city, small city, or suburb); Sarah Smarsh, Opinion, Something
Special Is Happening in Rural America, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/09/17/opinion/rural-america.html [https://perma.cc/F2XE-B86R] (describing a “brain gain”
currently taking place in rural America).
63
Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 200.
55
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definitions characterize rurality by population scarcity, low population volumes, and distance from substantial population centers. For example, the
commonly used U.S. Census Bureau definition defines “rural” as anything
other than (1) an Urbanized Area of 50,000 or more people, or (2) Urban Clusters of between 2,500 and 50,000 people. 64 But formal legal definitions, of
which there are many, are not necessarily the best metrics by which to understand rural America today. This Article takes a somewhat broader view; an isolated town of 2,501 people is likely to face similar challenges as one that has a
population of 2,499. 65
Still, rural communities’ diversity—in topography, population, history,
and industrial activity—makes generalizations difficult. Rural America includes not only some of the world’s best farmland (in the Great Plains and the
Corn Belt, for instance), high-producing dairy regions (such as in Upstate New
York, Wisconsin, and New England), but also:
sprawling exurban areas on the outer edges of the nation’s largest
metropolitan areas; the vast arid range and desert lands in the
Southwest; the deep, mountainous forests of the Pacific Northwest;
the flat and humid coastal plain of the Southeast; the hardscrabble
towns and hollows of the Appalachians; the rocky shorelines and
working forests of New England, where rural villages look much as
they did a hundred years ago; and the glaciers and fjords of Alaska. 66
This diversity notwithstanding, common trends across these landscapes
and populations can be identified. Researchers at the Carsey Institute have
formulated a useful typology of rural places that helps narrow and define the
subjects of this Article. This typology describes four rural Americas, each
shaped by a handful of key differing factors that reflect how economic activity
does or does not sustain them. The four rural Americas include: (1) amenityrich rural America; (2) chronically poor rural America; (3) declining resourcedependent rural America; and (4) amenity/decline rural America, which is an
“in-between” category. 67

64

Urban and Rural, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/
guidance/geo-areas/urban-rural.html [https://perma.cc/8V3C-2ASB].
65
Cf. Lichter & Ziliak, supra note 58, at 10 (noting that “[f]ew scholars . . . embrace [the Census
Bureau’s] narrow definition . . . , instead preferring to use the Census Bureau’s official definition of
nonmetropolitan interchangeably with rural”).
66
Johnson, supra note 45, at 3–4.
67
LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON ET AL., CARSEY INST., UNIV. OF N.H., PLACE MATTERS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN FOUR RURAL AMERICAS 26–28 (2008).
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This Article is least concerned with the first and last categories. Although
amenity-rich rural places do have challenges, such as gentrification, inequality,
and access to quality jobs, their concerns more closely resemble those seen in
urban places. Being rural is not as much of a concern for relatively affluent
places like Aspen and Vail, Colorado, for instance. 68 Category four, with its
decline and amenities frequently cancelling each other out, is also not the central focus of this Article, although it shares some commonalities with categories two and three.
This Article centers on the two most extreme forms of today’s rural distress: chronically poor communities and communities in decline. Although today’s dominant discourse focuses more on communities in decline, part of this
Article’s argument is that the discussion should also include chronically poor
communities. For purposes of the subsequent discussion, each category corresponds more closely with one type of distributive injustice that this Article
seeks to articulate.
According to the Carsey Institute’s report, chronically poor rural America
shares some similarities with declining rural America. 69 Both communities are
concerned about crime, drugs, and employment opportunities. Two main differences are that chronically poor rural America has lost less population and is
constituted of more non-white populations, particularly African Americans.70
This category describes substantial parts of the rural South including central
Appalachia, many Native-American reservations, and other pockets of concentrated poverty across Western states.
The declining communities referenced by category three are predominantly
white, comprised mostly of at least second-generation residents who grew up in
the area and remained there long-term. The decline is largely driven by young
adults leaving. In addition to population loss, job opportunities and drug manufacturing and sales are prominent regional problems. 71 These declining communities are the places that this Article has in mind when it turns to the utilitarian
sacrifice of rural communities for the greater good, although resource disparities
also affect these localities. This category describes parts of Appalachia, the deindustrializing Midwest, and timber communities in the Pacific Northwest.

68
See Nicholas Riccardi, Aspen Split Between Wealthy Visitors and the Working Poor That Serve
Them, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 12, 2015), https://skift.com/2015/01/12/aspen-split-between-wealthyvisitors-and-the-working-poor-that-serve-them/ [https://perma.cc/5LC2-7C8F].
69
HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 67, at 27.
70
Id. Chronically poor rural America also has lower educational attainment, lower household
incomes, fewer elderly residents, and a higher reliance on food stamps. Id.
71
Id. at 26.
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B. Background on Chronic Rural Poverty
Chronic rural poverty, the issue that most directly affects category two
communities, has a long and difficult history. Although it is usually measured
as an economic phenomenon by departments such as the U.S. Census Bureau,
poverty may be defined as “a multidimensional concept that involves insufficient income relative to need and limited access to resources such as education,
health care, and social and political power.” 72
The persistence of rural poverty is one feature that may set it apart from
urban poverty. Rural poverty emerged as a national policy issue in the 1930s,
when the Great Depression drew attention to dire living conditions for certain
populations outside cities. 73 In 1968, a report from the President’s National
Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty stated, “Rural poverty is so widespread, and so acute, as to be a national disgrace[.]” 74 The Johnson administration’s War on Poverty began in 1964 and created a legislative framework largely still in effect today. The War on Poverty made notable dents in rural challenges. 75
In spite of these improvements, rural poverty has proven more difficult to
eradicate than urban poverty. 76 Since 1959, poverty rates in rural America have
outpaced their urban counterparts. 77 And recent trends highlight growing cause
for concern. As of 2009–2013, roughly one-quarter of U.S. counties were considered high poverty counties, a seventy percent increase from 1999 (when
sixteen percent of counties were high poverty). These high-poverty counties
were disproportionately rural. Over this period, approximately one-third of
rural counties were considered high-poverty, compared to one-sixth of metro
counties. 78
Thus, concentrated, chronic rural poverty remains a substantial problem
today. Chronic rural poverty is exacerbated by rural socioeconomic decline.
Yet, the dominant discourse described above focuses almost entirely on communities in decline.

72

Bruce Weber & Kathleen Miller, Poverty in Rural America Then and Now, in RURAL POVsupra note 4, at 28, 38.
73
Id. at 35.
74
Id. at 31.
75
See id. at 39–41 (discussing War on Poverty and stating that rural poverty declined during the
1960s under the Johnson administration); see also Donald E. Voth, A Brief History and Assessment of
Federal Rural Development Programs and Policies, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1265, 1272–75 (1995).
76
Weber & Miller, supra note 72, at 33.
77
Id. at 40.
78
Id. at 51. These 828 counties were “concentrated primarily in Appalachia, the southern Black
Belt and Mississippi Delta, along the Mexican border, and on Native American tribal reservations.”
Id. at 50.
ERTY,
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Communities in decline are susceptible to the spread of poverty.79 But the
inattention to longstanding chronic poverty is a critical problem: communities
in decline tend to be majority white, while rural communities of color have
been disproportionately burdened by chronic poverty since well before the onset of modern rural decline. As of 2013, rural African Americans had the highest incidence of poverty at 37.3%; rural Native Americans had the second
highest rate at 34.4%; and rural Hispanics had the third highest rate at 28.2%.
Rural whites, by contrast, experienced a poverty rate of 15.9%, which is similar to rates of urban poverty. 80 Although communities in decline certainly warrant attention—and are vulnerable to poverty—a discussion of rural decline
should also include a discussion of persistent rural poverty.
C. Background on Rural Economic Transformation
Despite concerns about rural poverty in the 1960s, rural communities
were collectively more prosperous in the mid- and late-twentieth century than
they are now. 81 The changing rural landscape stems in large part from changes
in rural economic activity.
Rural livelihoods have ebbed and flowed in and out of various sectors
over the past hundred years, as the nation shifted away from a majority agrarian society to an industrialized one. 82 The overall effect, though, has been a relatively abrupt transition. 83 A century ago, approximately sixty percent of U.S.
residents lived in rural areas, and forty percent worked on farms. 84 Today, approximately fifteen to twenty percent of U.S. residents live in rural areas, but a
mere one to two percent work on farms. 85
The past several decades themselves have also seen dramatic transformations. And contrary to common wisdom, rural livelihoods have never been
synonymous with agriculture in the modern era. As of 1970, in high-density
rural areas, agriculture, forestry, fishing, manufacturing, and mining accounted
for approximately thirty-eight percent of employment altogether, while in low-

79

Id. at 32 (explaining that most rural poverty is in the Southeast, but deindustrialization since the
1980s has led to the spread of poverty in the Midwest and Northeast, as did the Great Recession).
80
Harvey & Harris, supra note 4, at 146.
81
See Porter, supra note 10 (explaining that “[r]ural communities once captured a greater share of
the nation’s prosperity” and detailing the sustained job creation in rural America during the 1990s).
82
Carolyn Dimitri et al., The 20th Century Transformation of U.S. Agriculture and Farm Policy,
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ERS BULL., June 2005, at 2 –5, https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/22832/PDF
[https://perma.cc/DC2L-JF7Y].
83
Cf. STEVEN STOLL, RAMP HOLLOW: THE ORDEAL OF APPALACHIA 28–30 (2017) (observing
that until only very recently in human history, the vast majority of people were subsistence agrarians).
84
Weber & Miller, supra note 72, at 34, 36.
85
Id. at 36.
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density rural areas, these sectors accounted for thirty-six percent of employment. 86
The already substantial proportions of those employment numbers do not
paint the full picture of the significance of these traditional rural livelihoods to
communities dependent upon them. These livelihoods often centered on largescale productive activity with a substantial land use or environmental footprint.
These industries have been distinct from other significant employers, like the
service or retail sectors, in the magnitude of their presence and their relationships with local governments. Industries such as coal and timber may account
for millions of dollars in tax revenue through measures such as severance taxes, which are then distributed to rural municipalities, counties, and reservations. 87 Thus, although these industries employed just over one-third of residents, 88 their role in a regional way of life often loomed even larger than the
already-large proportion suggests.
By 2007, these industries had declined dramatically.89 Over this period, agriculture, forestry, fishing, manufacturing, and mining went from accounting for
86

COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, STRENGTHENING THE RURAL ECONOMY—THE CURRENT
STATE OF RURAL AMERICA (2010) [hereinafter CURRENT STATE OF RURAL AMERICA], https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/cea/factsheets-reports/strengthening-the-ruraleconomy/the-current-state-of-rural-america [https://perma.cc/P623-6JXH]. The exact breakdown of
rural livelihoods is as follows: agriculture, forestry, and fishing accounted for thirteen percent of jobs
in high-density rural areas and twenty-three percent of jobs in low-density rural areas; manufacturing
accounted for twenty-three percent of jobs in high-density rural areas and ten percent of jobs in lowdensity rural areas; and mining accounted for two percent of jobs in high-density rural areas and three
percent of jobs in low-density rural areas. Other major sectors included government, the service sector, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate, and “other.” Id.
87
See RORY MCILMOIL & EVAN HANSEN, DOWNSTREAM STRATEGIES, THE DECLINE OF CENTRAL APPALACHIAN COAL AND THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION 1 (Jan. 19, 2010), http://
www.downstreamstrategies.com/documents/reports_publication/DownstreamStrategies-DeclineOf
CentralAppalachianCoal-FINAL-1-19-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/55PX-6JTJ] (discussing the coal industry’s role in filling the tax coffers of local governments in Appalachia); see also Anderson, supra
note 8, at 481 (discussing the relationship between federal timber funds paid in lieu of taxes and regional reliance on the industry in the northwest); Alan Ramo & Deborah Behles, Transitioning a
Community Away from Fossil-Fuel Generation to a Green Economy: An Approach Using State Utility
Commission Authority, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 515 (2014) (discussing the tax revenue Hopi
and Navajo tribes derived from their coal mines); Julie Turkewitz, Tribes That Live Off Coal Hold
Tight to Trump’s Promises, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/us/
trump-coal-promises.html [https://perma.cc/ZJ8M-LHLS] (explaining how half of the Crow Tribe’s
non-federal budget comes from royalties and taxes on coal extracted from a mine located on the reservation; the mine also supports 170 jobs).
88
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89
CURRENT STATE OF RURAL AMERICA, supra note 86. The exact breakdown of these sectors is
as follows: agriculture, forestry, and fishing accounted for six percent of jobs in high-density areas
and twelve percent in low-density areas; manufacturing accounted for thirteen percent of jobs in highdensity rural areas and seven percent in low-density rural areas; and mining accounted for one percent
in high-density rural areas and three percent in low-density rural areas. Id.
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more than one-third of rural employment to less than one-fifth. 90 The localized
effects have been more dramatic for many communities, however. In rural
Southeast Alaska, forestry was once the region’s economic driver, providing a
peak of 3,400 jobs in 1990; this figure dropped to just 214 in 2009. 91 As of 2011,
seventy-five percent of residents believed that the loss of forestry jobs was negatively affecting their communities.92 In North Carolina, manufacturing jobs
dropped from 761,000 in 2000 to 429,000 in 2010, a drop of forty-four percent
that disproportionately affected rural communities. 93 Former timber communities of the Pacific Northwest are still in crisis following reductions in timbering
on public lands. 94 Meanwhile, coal communities in central Appalachia struggle
with a fully collapsed regional economy. 95 Iowa has lost thirty percent of its
farms since 1977. 96 The story may differ depending upon the region in question,
but common themes are change and loss of a way of life.
These data show that the makeup of rural livelihoods has shifted substantially in modern U.S. history. Yet, it does not appear that these sectors have
been replaced by new ones. Over the course of the same time period, economic
growth has disproportionately benefited large urban centers. 97 With the eco90
See id. (detailing how traditional rural livelihoods once made up roughly thirty-six to thirtyeight percent of rural employment; that number has decreased to roughly twenty percent). Since some
of these livelihoods—such as forestry and mining—are rural by nature, changes in those livelihoods
had less of an effect on urban communities. The numbers may look similar for manufacturing in urban
places: in 1970, twenty-five percent of the workforce as a whole worked in manufacturing, compared
to 8.5% today. Sara Bauerle Danzman & Jeff D. Colgan, Robots Aren’t Killing the American Dream.
Neither Is Trade. This Is the Problem., WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/10/robots-arent-killing-the-american-dream-neither-is-trade-thisis-the-real-problem/ [https://perma.cc/5JV4-UZ6M]. These losses in manufacturing, however, have
had a more substantial impact on rural communities. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 467–68.
91
THOMAS G. SAFFORD ET AL., CARSEY INST., UNIV. OF N.H., JOBS, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE: A SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ALASKANS ABOUT SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 14 (2011).
92
Id. at 5.
93
David L. Carlton & Peter A. Coclanis, The Roots of Southern Deindustrialization, 61 CHALLENGE 418, 418 (2018).
94
Anderson, supra note 8, at 471 (describing the “crisis” in Oregon timber industry).
95
See CALVIN A. KENT, NAT’L ASS’N OF CTYS., THE CRUEL COAL FACTS: THE IMPACT ON
WEST VIRGINIA COUNTIES FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE COAL ECONOMY 1 (2016), http://www.
cbermu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2016-09-Cruel_Coal.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X7C-LN6G]
(stating that the “38 percent decline in West Virginia coal production plus the 71 percent fall in coal
prices since 2008 have led to a collapse of the State’s coal economy”).
96
Matthew Patane, How We Got Here: Iowa Farms Grow in Size, but There Are Fewer of Them,
CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE (June 17, 2019), https://www.thegazette.com/IowaIdeas/stories/agriculture/
how-we-got-here-iowa-farms-grow-in-size-but-there-are-fewer-of-them-family-farms-consolidationiowa-state-research-20180623 [https://perma.cc/6ZNP-4XK6].
97
See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT (2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/employment-education/
rural-employment-and-unemployment/ [https://perma.cc/92RE-X6FS] [hereinafter RURAL EMPLOY-
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nomic recession of 2008, rural communities as a whole fell below zero population growth for the first time in the country’s history. 98 This relatively novel
concentration of economic losses on rural places suggests that a distributive
justice inquiry is warranted.
The ripple effects of this economic decline have been severe. Mass migration to cities due to the changing economic landscape has affected both the
physical and the social rural landscape. 99 Shrunken populations have a ripple
effect on communities’ already-precarious economic health.100 As populations
shrink, local governments receive less tax revenue, and are in turn less able to
provide basic services, such as police protection. 101 Homes and businesses
stand empty, and as they fall into disrepair, they impose a new burden on cashstrapped local governments. 102 Rural hospitals and libraries have closed
throughout the country, leaving remaining residents under-served. 103 As the
built and infrastructural environment decays, new potential residents and investors are drawn to more livable places. 104 Young people continue to move

MENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT] (explaining that while urban communities have recovered from the
Great Recession, rural employment rates remain low compared to pre-recession levels); Carlton &
Coclanis, supra note 93, at 419 (asserting that a loss of rural jobs “has disproportionately hit the
small-town and rural South, particularly its heavily white populations, and has opened up enormous
disparities between these areas and the larger cities of the region”); Evert Meijers & Dick van der
Wouw, Struggles and Strategies of Rural Regions in the Age of the ‘Urban Triumph,’ 66 J. RURAL
STUD. 21, 21–22 (2019).
98
JOHN CROMARTIE, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL AREAS SHOW
OVERALL POPULATION DECLINE AND SHIFTING REGIONAL PATTERNS OF POPULATION CHANGE
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/september/rural-areas-show-overallpopulation-decline-and-shifting-regional-patterns-of-population-change/ [https://perma.cc/7TNKVPJF]; THOMAS HERTZ ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL EMPLOYMENT IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2014/
october/rural-employment-in-recession-and-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/426U-RXHN].
99
See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 187–88.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 197.
102
Id. at 193.
103
Sheldon Weisgrau, Issues in Rural Health: Access, Hospitals, and Reform, 17 HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV. 1, 1–7 (1995); see Jon Marcus & Matt Krupnick, The Rural Higher-Education Crisis, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/therural-higher-education-crisis/541188/ [https://perma.cc/XHW4-ZJTS] (explaining that rural areas
must “contend with drug and mental-health issues, poverty, and a lack of high-speed access to the
internet”); see also Darrell M. West & Jack Karsten, Rural and Urban America Divided by Broadband Access, BROOKINGS BLOG (July 18, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/07/
18/rural-and-urban-america-divided-by-broadband-access/ [https://perma.cc/22MM-ZQXM] (detailing how rural areas have slower broadband than urban areas).
104
See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 187–88.
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away because of a lack of opportunity. 105 Meanwhile, disproportionate rural
“deaths of despair” by opioids or suicide persist. 106
Yet, the nature of the industries that left these communities did not allow
for a clean break. Traditional rural livelihoods meant that longstanding industrial activities left legacies beyond lost jobs and socioeconomic despair. The
quality of water and air in mining communities remains precarious, for example; many of the mountaintops of the Appalachian mountain range have been
permanently felled to retrieve coal. 107 Power plants like the Navajo Generating
Station have “fouled the air and scarred the land that the tribe holds sacred.”108
Mill towns struggle to remediate the manufacturing centers-turnedbrownfields. 109 And the pollutants emitted by large agribusiness operations that
displaced residents and transformed communities often go unchecked. 110
The past several decades are also significant because of two transitional
moments that hint at alternative historical paths not traveled. First, during the
1970s, the already-declining rural population seemed to have balanced out. In
a period known as the “rural renaissance,” rural areas in fact grew at a faster
rate than cities. 111 Yet, certain legal and economic developments, among them
the aforementioned globalization and automation trends, seem to have steered
rural America downward starting just after that era. More recently, the 2008
Great Recession proved another decisive event. Widespread housing and busi-

105

See Semuels, supra note 9.
See OVERDOSE DEATH RATES, supra note 11 (explaining that the opioid crisis is having particularly harsh effects on rural areas); RURAL EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, supra note 97;
Brian Thiede et al., The Divide Between Rural and Urban America, in 6 Charts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-03-20/6-charts-thatillustrate-the-divide-between-rural-and-urban-america [https://perma.cc/339V-RFBG] (stating that
rural areas experience high poverty rates, fewer new jobs, and higher rates of disabilities); Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Suicide Rates for Rural Counties Consistently Higher
Than Urban Counties from 2001–2015 (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2017/
p1005-rural-suicide-rates.html [https://perma.cc/9QQT-XT2U].
107
McGinley, supra note 23, at 373.
108
James Rainey, Lighting the West, Dividing a Tribe, NBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://
www.nbcnews.com/specials/navajo-coal [https://perma.cc/DSW6-V8PT].
109
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVITALIZING AMERICA’S MILLS: A REPORT ON BROWNFIELDS
MILL PROJECTS 2, 24 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/mill_
report_110306.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3AV-AE83].
110
See, e.g., Margaret Carrel et al., Pigs in Space: Determining the Environmental Justice Landscape of Swine Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) in Iowa, 13 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES.
& PUB. HEALTH 849 (2016) (detailing harmful level of pollution produced by the swine industry).
111
See J. Paul Newell, Rural Healthcare: The Challenges of a Changing Environment, 47 MERCER L. REV. 979, 981 (1996) (“The 1970s were labeled a ‘rural renaissance,’ with the rate of rural
population growth outpacing urban growth for the first time in the twentieth century. However, this
trend was reversed in the 1980s, primarily because of the depressed rural economy.”).
106
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ness foreclosures and abandonments seemed to smother a spark that was otherwise fueling a path toward revitalization. 112
This Article is therefore not concerned solely with poverty—an already
pressing problem—but also with what appears to be the large-scale, systematic
unraveling of many rural local governments and related social and economic
systems throughout the country. Rural decline is not necessarily a tragedy per
se. Viewed through one lens, it makes sense for people to move to cities with
more job opportunities; it also makes sense for obsolete or hazardous industries to be phased out.113 But approximately sixty million people still live in
rural places; one-fifth of these sixty million are more vulnerable, non-white
populations. 114 As more young people leave rural America, and the ever-aging
rural population’s property values continue to drop, many rural localities will
continue to decline. 115 Even if it would be too daunting or irrational to try to
reverse these trends, the management of this decline—or the current lack
thereof—raises important ethical questions.
One response to these trends is that rural residents should simply relocate
to the places that enjoy a higher proportion of resources and greater economic
opportunity. 116 Yet, this solution to rural marginalization fails for several rea112

Annie Lowrey, The Great Recession Is Still with Us, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/12/great-recession-still-with-us/547268/ [https://perma.
cc/LD4U-4ZLM]; Gillian B. White, Rural America’s Silent Housing Crisis, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 28,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/01/rural-americas-silent-housing-crisis/
384885/ [https://perma.cc/2GVN-9B74].
113
See Dipak Kumar, Rural America Is Losing Young People—Consequences and Solutions,
WHARTON SCH. U. PENN. PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 23, 2018), https://publicpolicy.wharton.
upenn.edu/live/news/2393-rural-america-is-losing-young-people- [https://perma.cc/A9YA-BGAU]
(arguing that “economic migration supports free market allocation of labor, capital, and taxes” and
that the ability of rural Americans to move to more urban areas has benefitted the economy and contributed to growth).
114
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, New Census Data Show Differences Between Urban and
Rural Populations (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-210.
html [https://perma.cc/X8XW-FS5W]; see Tieken, supra note 4 (providing data that among rural
residents who are minorities, about forty percent are Black, thirty-five percent nonwhite Hispanic, and
twenty-five percent Native-American, Asian, Pacific Islander, or multiracial).
115
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 114.
116
Cf. Arnold, supra note 16, at 191 (explaining that the inequitable funding for rural welfare
programs stems from assumptions that rural residents eventually migrate to cities and that to help this
declining, politically insignificant population would be futile anyway); Nick Gillespie, If Rural Americans Are Being ‘Left Behind,’ Why Don’t They Just Move?, REASON (Jan. 9, 2018), https://reason.
com/blog/2018/01/09/if-rural-americans-are-being-left-behind [https://perma.cc/XF42-T9HT]; Henry
Grabar, In Defense of the Small City, SLATE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://slate.com/business/2018/02/smallcities-and-rural-areas-deserve-revitalization.html [https://perma.cc/J4AQ-RECZ]; Heather Long,
America’s Forgotten Towns: Can They Be Saved or Should People Just Leave?, WASH. POST (Jan. 2,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/01/02/americas-forgotten-towns-canthey-be-saved-or-should-people-just-leave/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.03f59776dca9 [https://perma.
cc/7U4K-KJD6]. See generally ELIZABETH CATTE, WHAT YOU ARE GETTING WRONG ABOUT APPA-
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sons. First, the de facto policy in most areas to address rural decline has been
just this approach: residents in dying or long-struggling communities have
been left to their own devices with the hope that they will relocate to more livable locales. Many have indeed moved, but many have not. Those who remain
may be unable to move because of a lack of resources or other impediments to
mobility. 117 They may also decline to move because they do not want to. The
high rates of rural suicides, opioid overdose deaths, and other “deaths of despair” should prompt commentators to more deeply examine the impediments
to rural mobility.
This line of thinking also raises the question of whether it is ethically objectionable to mandate mobility, or whether the onus is on public entities to
provide basic services to existing communities. It is not necessarily clear that
life would be better in a large urban center, where housing costs, long commutes, and a loss of community may bring a qualitatively different form of
suffering upon relocation. 118 The “just move” argument also presumes that
there will always be a perfect match of opportunities available to those who
would seek them, only potentially in a different place. This presumption seems
faulty, especially as we move into a future that will increasingly displace
workers through automation. 119
Finally, as this analysis illustrates, the “just move” argument also ignores
the structural forces that have shaped the modern rural status quo. It is not the
case that well-informed individuals en masse decided to locate themselves in
an unfortunate locale and can simply undo the decision. Rural communities
have often been crafted over the course of decades in order to create a workforce to provide public necessities. The presumption of perfect individual autonomy seems questionable; many people were born where they are, and after
multiple generations became reliant on a local mono-economy that was formed
on the basis of public subsidies and other policy drivers. 120 In other words, toLACHIA (2018) (describing the author’s personal experience of having many people ask her why more
Appalachians do not simply leave Appalachia, in light of difficult living conditions).
117
See Schleicher, supra note 2, at 78 (discussing reasons why poor Americans find it difficult to
relocate to areas with more employment opportunities, and labeling Americans in the twenty-first
century as “homebodies”).
118
Cf. Patrick Sisson, The Housing Crisis Isn’t Just About Affordability—It’s About Economic
Mobility, Too, CURBED (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2018/4/24/17275068/jobs-mobilityhigh-rent-housing-costs [https://perma.cc/9SP7-B4GH] (discussing the prohibitively high cost of
housing in California and land-use restrictions that discourage migration from rural areas to urban
areas).
119
See Leigh C. Anderson, Automation Is Coming for More Jobs Than You May Realize, SALON
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/11/29/automation-is-coming-for-more-jobs-than-youmay-realize/ [https://perma.cc/XNS8-DSWE].
120
Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 302–04 (discussing the public role in creating communities dependent upon fossil fuels); Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 13–14 (discussing the role of the
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day’s rural marginalization was not created by each individual’s faulty choices,
but by society as a whole. As such, the allocation of resources that shapes rural
inequity is worthy of everyone’s attention. 121
D. “Rural” as an Intersectional Concept
Some may still be skeptical as to whether rurality is a meaningful lens for
understanding these forms of inequity. First, other factors, such as race, have a
causal relationship with poverty and exposure to environmental hazards; indeed, white rural residents may well be among the populations exploiting rural
residents of color. 122 Second, urban communities also face challenges like
those described above, which may suggest that the rural plight is not unique,
but a part of broader societal trends in inequality.
This Article readily acknowledges that rurality is not always the most important factor. Both enslaved people and plantation owners were once “rural,”
and it was not their rurality that shaped their power relations. Yet, rurality warrants attention for several reasons. 123 One reason is the nature of rurality itself. 124 Rural residents, by definition, live outside large population centers.
This fact alone carries a host of realities. Land is a more dominant part of life,
and as such, land uses may have more direct and potent relationships with
people’s lives, livelihoods, and welfare.125 The scarcer population renders local
governments weaker and people enjoy fewer protections by way of land use

New Deal and Farm Bill in shaping the development of agricultural communities); Hardy, supra note
41 (noting that economic policies affect how economic growth is distributed and that the twenty-first
century has seen “systematic defunding” of rural communities).
121
Cf. Lichter & Brown, supra note 46, at 1 (arguing that all Americans should be concerned
about the plight of rural America, not least because of rural America’s important role in providing
foodstuffs, natural resources, and recreational opportunities for the rest of the country).
122
See, e.g., Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 15–17 (discussing the role of white farmers and
the U.S. Department of Agriculture in driving black farmers off their land throughout the twentieth
century, contributing to a ninety percent drop in black farmers between 1920 and 1970—from 925,000
to fewer than 10,000).
123
Cf. Lichter & Brown, supra note 46, at 1 (explaining that “rural and urban are ‘complementary
parts’ of a nation’s settlement system, and ‘familiarity with only one of them limits understanding of
the whole’” (quoting Peter Schaeffer et al., Urban and Rural: Opportunities No More!, 28 ECON.
DEV. Q. 1, 3–4 (2014))).
124
See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Politics of the Rural Vote, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 743, 746 (2003) (discussing how “rural dwellers are tied together by virtue of living in rural areas, and common issues
exist for those residing in the most isolated—the most rural—of rural areas, including unifying themes
of isolation, poverty, and lack of access to goods and services”).
125
Cf. SAFFORD ET AL., supra note 91, at 7 (observing that because “rural communities are closely tied to nature,” research needs to investigate rural residents’ views of environmental problems and
related attitudes about development opportunities); Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 204.
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planning and zoning ordinances. 126 The lack of development makes economic
opportunities scarcer, driving more people to engage in hazardous or undesirable economic activity to survive. 127 The distance from population centers
brings with it invisibility, a veil between rural residents and a mainstream population that may be either ignorant or indifferent to abuses that take place outside of cities. 128
But some trends permeate rural communities nationwide, in addition to
consistent qualitative themes concerning land, scarcity, invisibility, and law’s
more limited reach into daily life. 129 The vast majority of persistent poverty
counties are located in rural areas. 130 Rural communities as a whole have also
lost population and have seen residents’ sources of income change in recent
decades. 131 Studies that control for various factors, including place, have
demonstrated as much, in addition to observations of large-scale trends. 132 As
with other characteristics, place interacts with factors such as race, class, and
gender to shape a person or community’s experiences. 133 Critically, “rural” is
not synonymous with “white,” just as “urban” is not synonymous with
“black.” 134 Ultimately, the premise in this Article is that place matters in addition to the other factors that are considered relevant to marginalization.
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See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Sprawl’s Shepard: The Rural County, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 365,
369–70 (2012).
127
See generally Benjamin E. Apple, Mapping Fracking: An Analysis of Law, Power, and Regional Distribution in the United States, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 217 (2014) (discussing rural municipalities’ vulnerability to coercive, uncontrolled development scenarios due to scarcity of opportunities); Ann M. Eisenberg, Beyond Science and Hysteria: Reality and Perceptions of Environmental
Justice Concerns Surrounding Marcellus and Utica Shale Gas Development, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 183
(2015).
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Pruitt & Showman, supra note 42, at 482.
129
See, e.g., Lichter & Brown, supra note 46, at 1 (identifying general depopulation, chronic outmigration of young people, and rapid aging as common themes across rural America).
130
Weber & Miller, supra note 72, at 40–42.
131
CROMARTIE, supra note 98.
132
E.g., Mark P. Doescher & J. Elizabeth Jackson, Trends in Cervical and Breast Cancer Screening Practices Among Women in Rural and Urban Areas in the United States 11 (2008) (working paper, Rural Health Research Center, University of Washington), http://depts.washington.edu/uwrhrc/
uploads/RHRC_FR121_Doescher.pdf [https://perma.cc/93UY-5E84].
133
See Arnold, supra note 16, at 191 (observing that rural residents generally experience a “much
higher incidence of substandard housing,” while “[s]ome minority groups, such as rural blacks and
migrant farmworkers, experience a grossly disproportionate degree of substandard housing”); Bassett,
supra note 39, at 328 (explaining that discrimination against protected groups, such as women and
minorities, is heightened in rural America).
134
Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 193 (discussing this stereotype and observing that many African Americans live in rural America).
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II. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE RURAL CONDITION
This Part turns to theories of distributive justice and argues that they have
under-examined relevance to the rural condition.135 Section A provides a broad
overview of distributive justice theories and establishes this inquiry as a
Rawlsian one focused on the unfairness of placing burdens on discrete groups
for the benefit of all. 136 Section B discusses the specific burdens of economic
loss and environmental hazards, additional theoretical frameworks that emphasize unfairness specific to those burdens, and the unique relevance of these
particular factors to today’s conditions and the question of whether rural communities have experienced injustice. 137
A. Theories of Distributive Justice
An exploration of distributive justice and its application to the rural condition today seems critical for several reasons. First, the persistence of rural
poverty raises questions as to the distributional decisions that either shape that
poverty or fail to address it. Second, the functional role of rural communities in
American life and the widespread “ruralization” of economic distress raise
questions about whether rural communities have disproportionately shouldered
society’s burdens and losses and, if so, whether that distribution is “just.”
Third, scholars’ and policymakers’ flummoxed response to today’s rural challenges—including socioeconomic decline, local government struggles, and
infrastructural decay—suggests that a theoretically-grounded discussion of
what is fair or unfair about urban and rural dynamics can help inform approaches to these problems.
Literature on the various theories of distributive justice is vast and diverse; one can begin with Aristotle and spend a lifetime on the subsequent
2,400 years of writings. 138 This Section does not debate or defend the legitimacy of a particular subset of those ideas. Instead, it accepts certain premises as
givens and forms a framework by which to assess potential injustices that have
shaped rural America.
Prominent concepts purporting to establish how resources should be allocated include Rawlsianism, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, Pareto efficiency, and
equalitarianism. 139 Questions central to each of these theories include: (1) How
should social, economic, and other benefits and burdens be distributed
135

See infra notes 136–179 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 138–149 and accompanying text.
137
See infra notes 150–179 and accompanying text.
138
See generally ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS (Carnes Lord trans., U. of Chi. Press 2nd ed.
2013) (discussing the pursuit of virtue within political communities).
139
Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 982 (2001).
136
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throughout a population? (2) Is it acceptable for a minority group’s welfare to
be reduced in the name of the aggregate welfare? (3) If the answer to the latter
question is “yes,” what are the conditions warranting such a tradeoff? (4) If a
group is sacrificed in the name of aggregate welfare, should there be offsetting
benefits or compensation? And finally, (5) what institutional design will
achieve the fairest distributions?
Equalitarianism is the only concept that demands full equality in distributions and related socioeconomic status. 140 A synthesis of the other three
schools of thought reveals, first, the principle that policy developments are best
if no one is made worse off. But, given that virtually all transitions or distributional decisions make someone worse off, that loss can be justified either if the
losers are compensated or if the decision enhances the welfare of the most vulnerable members of society.
This Article’s inquiry is essentially a Rawlsian one, informed by the idea
that unfairness is inherent in “the arbitrary imposition of selective burdens on
the few for the benefit of the many.” 141 Rawls’s famous “original position” and
“veil of ignorance” concepts address the questions above.142 He argues that we
should design a society as if we did not know what life and characteristics we
would be born into. 143 These principles are based on the premise that we tend
to advocate the sacrifice of a particular population in the name of the aggregate
welfare if we do not belong to that population. But if we were part of the group
made less well off, we would design society’s allocation of benefits and burdens to ensure that the sacrificed minority were as well off as possible.144 In
other words, according to Rawls, a certain level of minority sacrifice may be
acceptable, but there should be adequately offsetting benefits to the most vulnerable members of society.
The Rawlsian framework has unique applicability to the rural context.
Namely, much of traditional rural life centers on productive activities that increase aggregate welfare.145 This relationship does not inherently necessitate
neglect or sacrifice; farmers and miners, for instance, could theoretically be the
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Id. at 983–84.
See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 394 (2000) (discussing Professor Frank Michelman’s
classic law review article—Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
“Just Compensation” Law—on when a government taking can be “just” within the Rawlsian theory
of distributive justice (citing 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967)).
142
See RAWLS, supra note 14, at 136–42 (discussing the concept of the “veil of ignorance”).
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See id.
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See id. at 183–92.
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highest-paid workers in a society. 146 Yet, in the United States, the reality of
many rural livelihoods has been hard work, hazardous conditions, long hours,
uncertain rewards, and limited reciprocal benefits.147 Distributive justice questions arise at the most fundamental level of urban-rural relations. These relations have raised even more urgent distributive justice questions as traditional
rural livelihoods have been phased out, with that decline itself rationalized in
the name of collective progress.
In applying the broad theoretical questions posed above, distributive justice inquiries may ask two more specific questions: (1) What are the actual distributions of benefits and burdens among groups, and are they justified? (2)
Are the procedures or political processes that determined those allocations
fair? 148 This Article focuses more on the former question to make the case that
chronic rural poverty is linked to distributive injustice, and the latter question
to make the case that rural communities in decline have experienced distributive injustice. But, as will be shown in Part III, the treatment of rural communities seems likely to fail any of these tests. 149 Rural populations of color are
among the most vulnerable communities in the country, yet modern distributional decisions consistently fail to improve their quality of life. The alienation
expressed by rural communities in decline, in addition to the regional decay
they are experiencing, suggests that losses associated with rural decline—
which Part III will show cannot be blithely dismissed as a market-based phenomenon—remain uncompensated.
B. The Burdens of Economic Loss and Environmental Hazards
To further illuminate the circumstances affecting communities in decline,
the analysis below narrows its focus to emphasize two specific forms of burden: economic losses and environmental hazards. The discussion draws on the
concept of the “just transition” to characterize inordinate economic losses that
have been imposed on rural communities in decline. 150 The idea of just transi146
See, e.g., Eric Bellman, With Cash Handouts, India Takes Step Toward Universal Basic Income, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-cash-handouts-india-takes-steptoward-universal-basic-income-11549020444 [https://perma.cc/2CNM-E54Q] (discussing government measures in India that are moving the country toward providing universal basic income for small
farmers).
147
See Shannon Elizabeth Bell & Richard York, Community Economic Identity: The Coal Industry and Ideology Construction in West Virginia, 75 RURAL SOC. 111, 112 (2010); David L. Hard &
John R. Myers, Fatal Work-Related Injuries in the Agriculture Production Sector Among Youth in the
United States, 1992–2002, 11 J. AGROMEDICINE 57, 58 (2006); Pruitt, supra note 41, at 169–70.
148
Kaswan, supra note 18, at 1047, 1062.
149
See infra notes 180–320 and accompanying text.
150
See Daniels et al., supra note 37, at 6–7 (discussing “economic externalities that society’s
pursuit of environmental protection imposes on the poor and vulnerable” and arguing that “without
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tions has grown increasingly popular in the face of efforts to decarbonize the
economy. The term first emerged in union advocacy in the mid-twentieth century when curtailments on hazardous industrial activity began to displace
workers in those industries. 151 The idea was that workers alone should not bear
their economic loss if society is to benefit from policies that result in them losing their livelihoods. Rather, the loss should be distributed equitably among
everyone.
Although the concept of a just transition has not been widely recognized
as a principle of distributive justice, the concentration of economic losses on
rural communities signals its theoretical relevance. Many today are discussing
just transitions in a forward-looking sense, asking what measures can be taken
to ensure a fair distribution of losses in the transition to clean energy. For instance, as scientists and economists have acknowledged that effective reductions in carbon emissions will displace workers in the fossil fuel sector, commentators have recognized the need for measures to ensure that the economic
losses associated with this transition are not unfairly concentrated on fossil fuel
workers and communities. 152
Yet, few have applied this lens to the past, asking which workers and
communities have already borne disproportionate losses in the name of the
greater good. Demands for just transitions equate to demands for the equitable
distribution of economic losses.153 These demands suggest that it is worthwhile
to ask whether past transitions could be deemed unjust, and what consequences
flow from “unjust transitions.”
The concept of a just transition raises questions that relate directly to a
society’s design and the distributive theories discussed above. Legal and economic transitions are necessary for society to evolve. 154 Legislatures must, it is
presumed, be able to regulate without necessarily creating offsetting benefits
for anyone who stands to lose in some way as a result of the regulation.155 This
concern is a central focus of discussions on the causes of these losses: most are
comfortable compensating or mitigating losses to communities if those losses
full and careful consideration of how environmental protection affects the poor and the vulnerable,”
justice for rural America will be unattainable).
151
LES LEOPOLD, THE MAN WHO HATED WORK AND LOVED LABOR 468 (2007).
152
Robert Pollin & Brian Callaci, A Just Transition for U.S. Fossil Fuel Industry Workers, AM.
PROSPECT (July 6, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/just-transition-us-fossil-fuel-industry-workers
[https://perma.cc/6F8H-DWGT].
153
See David J. Doorey, A Law of Just Transitions? Putting Labour Law to Work on Climate
Change, 12 OSGOODE LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, no. 35, 2016, at 1, 2, 9; Eisenberg, supra note
24, at 278.
154
Doremus, supra note 31, at 3.
155
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (explaining that “[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law”).
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are clearly a result of public action. 156 This acceptance arises most notably in
the takings context where compensation is constitutionally required. 157 Employment losses may also evoke such sympathy if public causation is clear. But
mitigating losses associated with “economic transitions” strike commentators
as less worthy of attention—even though differentiating legal and economic
transitions in our society seems virtually impossible. 158 In short, laissez-faire
ideologies in the United States suggest that we should err on the side of having
workers bear their own losses, and only in rare cases and under certain conditions have society as a whole attempt to shoulder those losses collectively. 159
This stance raises the question of what is to be made of rural America.
Declining rural communities are a living (or dying) example of the logical extreme of asking communities and workers to shoulder concentrated burdens of
economic losses. Although the trade adjustment programs discussed below
appear to have attempted to offset some rural losses, rural conditions today
suggest such measures were mere drops in the bucket. To deny that this experiment has been a failure is to deny the existence of literal widespread death and
despair outside the country’s major urban centers, as well as the political and
cultural alienation that has percolated in rural places for decades. 160
The theoretical concerns outlined here, such as the repugnancy of minority sacrifice in the name of aggregate welfare, suggest that just transitions are a
principle of distributive justice worth deeper contemplation. As with other
models of distributive justice, just transitions have a substantive and a procedural component. A transition is substantively “unjust” if workers in a particular sector alone bear the costs of societal evolution beyond a hazardous or obsolete industry. 161 The procedural path toward a just transition involves more
meaningful avenues for input by affected groups in order for them to have a
chance to ensure better outcomes for themselves. 162

156
Cf. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 513–14
(1986) (arguing that the way to approach transitional policy is determining whether there was uncertainty of future government policy when investments were made).
157
Cf. Michelman, supra note 31, at 1165 (noting the role of the takings clause in determining
when the government can implement transitions while concentrating costs on discrete individuals or
groups).
158
See Kaplow, supra note 156, at 534 (“[T]here is little to distinguish losses arising from government and market risk.”).
159
See Revesz, supra note 17, at 1500 (explaining that the idea that legal rules can or should not
redistribute wealth or income “has become a tenet of law and economics orthodoxy”).
160
See generally DYER, supra note 20 (theorizing connections among abrupt rural economic
losses and rise in rural antigovernment sentiment).
161
Fergus Green, Transition Policy for Climate Change Mitigation: Who, What, Why and How 3
(Crawford Sch. of Pub. Policy, Australian Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 1805, 2018).
162
See Doorey, supra note 153, at 43.
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In an era of rapid, ongoing transitions and increasing inequality, the concept’s relevance will continue to be implicated. Yet, more pragmatically, an
embrace of the just transition concept may enhance political stability and reduce polarization more than current neoliberal policies. Ample literature connects rural economic marginalization with widespread anti-government sentiment. 163 It is worth contemplating whether the failure to ensure just transitions
over the past several decades has contributed to this alienation. The past failure
to ensure just transitions also raises the question of what risks, both ethical and
practical, may be run in the future by allowing economic losses to be concentrated on other discrete populations. 164
The subsequent discussion also focuses on the specific burden of environmental hazards in declining rural communities. Environmental justice theory focuses in part on fairness in society’s distributions of environmental hazards or benefits. This framework, too, illuminates modern rural conditions.
Primarily, it is the environmental context where utilitarian thinking about rural
places seems the most tempting. Because rural places have fewer people and
more space, it seems almost natural that land uses such as shale gas extraction,
nuclear waste storage, and wind farm installations are destined to be borne by
rural communities, when we would be loath to allow them in cities, or when
doing so would be impracticable. 165 Rural environmental injustice has also
received little academic and public attention. Because of widespread rural environmental hazards that have been pursued in the name of the greater good, it
seems worth exploring relationships between rural communities and society’s
environmental benefits and burdens.
Rural environmental injustice has tended to be at the periphery of environmental justice conversations. 166 This oversight stems in part from a focus
163

See CRAMER, supra note 1, at 9 (detailing white, rural working-class resentment towards politicians who do not reflect their social values and who are perceived as not promoting the interests of
rural communities); Doorey, supra note 153, at 21 (noting that decent employment is central to political stability). See generally ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND (2016) (examining social factors that contributed to the rise of the right-wing Tea Party in a rural town).
164
Cf. Revesz, supra note 17, at 1498 (noting the ability of groups to impede welfare-enhancing
legal reforms when those groups stand to bear disproportionate burdens, and suggesting such distributional issues played a role in 2016 presidential election).
165
See Shelley Welton & Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 308, 361 (2019) (explaining how the “urban/rural divide” is more pronounced
in the context of siting clean energy production sources because renewable facilities are more difficult
than conventional ones to site in population centers); Sarah Zhang, The White House Revives a Controversial Plan for Nuclear Waste, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
science/archive/2017/03/yucca-mountain-trump/519972/ [https://perma.cc/N6JU-3T8H] (discussing
the long-planned nuclear storage facility at Yucca Mountain, a location chosen in part due to its remoteness).
166
See David N. Pellow, Environmental Justice and Rural Studies: A Critical Conversation and
Invitation to Collaboration, 47 J. RURAL STUD. 381, 381 (2016) (observing that although “the rural
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on race and class in rural environmental justice scenarios. 167 Meanwhile, “the
spatial relationships and tensions between urban and rural communities” have
not been sufficiently studied or emphasized. 168 The limited legal literature on
rural environmental injustice in the United States has tended to focus either on
farmworkers or on natural resource extraction and energy production. 169 A recent discourse among rural sociologists takes a broader view, characterizing
the urban majority’s treatment of the rural as its “dumping ground.” 170
One reason for the limited attention to rural environmental injustice may
be the tacit belief that rural environmental injustice is somehow more “natural”
than environmental injustice elsewhere; in most minds, siting hazardous land
uses in rural places probably makes sense.171 Rural places have more space and

dimensions of environmental justice studies have long been present,” they have generally been “only
in the background, rarely foregrounded, centered, or taken seriously as a social, ecological, cultural,
economic, and political category that shapes [environmental justice] struggles everyday”).
167
Cf. Loka Ashwood & Kate MacTavish, Tyranny of the Majority and Rural Environmental
Injustice, 47 J. RURAL STUD. 271, 271 (2016) (arguing that rural issues should be brought to the forefront of environmental justice scholarship, “alongside race and class, to better address inequality in the
ecohuman community”); Lisa R. Pruitt & Linda T. Sobczynski, Protecting People, Protecting Places:
What Environmental Litigation Conceals and Reveals About Rurality, 47 J. RURAL STUD. 326, 326–
27 (2016) (observing that environmental litigation in rural areas is often framed within the context of
race rather than rurality, and contending that classist attitudes toward rural whites helped explain their
exclusion from environmental advocacy concerning a hog farm).
168
Pellow, supra note 166, at 382.
169
See, e.g., Ralph Santiago Abascal, California Rural Legal Assistance and Environmental Justice, 14 CHICANA/O LATINA/O L. REV. 44, 44–47 (1994); Jeanne Marie Zokovitch Paben, Green Power & Environmental Justice—Does Green Discriminate?, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1067, 1076–77
(2014) (observing that “a lot of people tend to think of environmental justice communities as being
only in urban areas; however, there has been growing attention paid to environmental justice impacts
from raw materials development thrust upon rural communities”); Raina Wagner, Adapting Environmental Justice: In the Age of Climate Change, Environmental Justice Demands a Combined Adaptation-Mitigation Response, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 153, 162 (2011) (noting the rural nature of
building wind farms on Native-American reservations); Anietie Maureene-Ann Akpan, Note, Tierra y
Vida: How Environmental Injustice Has Adversely Impacted the Public Health of Rural Brown Populations in South Texas, 43 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 321, 322 (2013); Sierra M. Jefferies, Note, Environmental
Justice and the Skull Valley Goshute Indians’ Proposal to Store Nuclear Waste, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 409, 409 (2007).
170
See Ashwood & MacTavish, supra note 167, at 274.
171
See Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of
Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1993) (“Because local protest can
be costly, time-consuming, and politically damaging, siting decision makers often take the path of
least resistance—choosing sites in neighborhoods that are least likely to protest effectively. Not surprisingly, many of the neighborhoods selected are populated disproportionately by the poor and by
people of color.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Ashwood & MacTavish, supra note 167, at 271
(“[P]ervasive logic commands state-industrial complexes across developing and developed nations:
rural sites have ample resources and fewer people, an ideal paring for taking and dumping.”).
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fewer people. The hazards have to go somewhere. And rural communities have
often neither regulated nor resisted hazardous land uses in their environs. 172
But if utilitarian reasoning—that minority sacrifice is justified by a concomitant increase in aggregate welfare—is generally considered ethically repugnant, why do so many embrace this form of reasoning when it concerns the
utilization of rural land and people? 173
The first reason is likely a belief that rural land uses reflect community
preferences. 174 But it is not clear that rural communities have always acquiesced to environmental hazards, despite what coal miners featured in the media
might lead the public to believe. Many rural communities have vocally protested hazardous industrial activities or even attempted to outlaw them—as has
been the case with natural resource extraction, hazardous waste storage, and
agribusiness throughout the country—only to have those activities imposed
nonetheless. 175
Indeed, the scarcity of land use regulations in rural communities does not
necessarily reflect a lack of concern for how land is used. It can also reflect a
172
See Ashwood & MacTavish, supra note 167, at 274; cf. Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning
Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 103 (1998) (laying out five examples of communities that have added land use regulations in an effort to better insulate and protect against hazardous uses and environmental injustices); Kaswan, supra note 18, at
1038–40 (discussing and challenging the “community preferences model” of environmental justice
that proposes the disproportionate siting of undesirable land uses in rural areas is not unjust if the
siting project satisfies the locality’s preferences).
173
See Kaswan, supra note 18, at 1062–67 (acknowledging that Rawls and other scholars deem a
utilitarian approach “to be inconsistent with the idea of reciprocity implicit in the notion of a wellordered society” and that “[e]quality is . . . a guiding principle in determining whether the distribution
of [locally undesirable land uses] is just”); see also OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, YUCCA MOUNTAIN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING REPORT 1–16 (first
rev. 2002), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/SER.PDF [perma.cc/MX6Z-TAJN]
(illustrating that low population density was one reason behind the proposed siting of Yucca mountain
nuclear waste storage site); Paben, supra note 169, at 1095 (discussing the argument for placing polluting biomass plants away from urban centers because “you can pollute more and you are not competing with the polluting rights of other industries”). See generally Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and
Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to
a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV 1047 (1994) (discussing considerations for hazardous and
radioactive waste disposal sites in urban and rural settings).
174
See Kaswan, supra note 18, at 1077–78.
175
See, e.g., Emily A. Kolbe, Note, “Won’t You Be My Neighbor?” Living with Concentrated
Animal Feeding Operations, 99 IOWA L. REV. 415, 441–42 (2013) (describing negative impacts of
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) and Iowans’ growing opposition to them); Ryan
Teel, Note, Not in My Neighborhood: The Fight Against Large-Scale Animal Feeding Operations in
Rural Iowa, Preemptive Tactics, and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 497,
519–523 (2007) (observing the difficulty that localities have in expelling CAFOs from the community
once they are established there). See generally CHAD MONTRIE, TO SAVE THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO SURFACE COAL MINING IN APPALACHIA (2003) (chronicling
fairly widespread opposition to surface mining in the Appalachia region during the twentieth century
despite support for mining from federal, state, and local governments).
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lack of capacity to adopt the local legal regimes that more populated and sophisticated communities use to protect themselves. Some would-be polluters
engage in strategic searches for those places where people are the least
equipped to protect themselves. 176 Because many rural residents are governed by
sparsely populated, poorly equipped counties rather than municipalities with
frameworks such as zoning ordinances, rural residents may be all the more vulnerable to these predatory practices. 177 These communities’ smaller populations also put them at a disadvantage when it comes to garnering the public
attention needed to successfully prevent undesired land uses.
Even if a utilitarian argument in favor of causing the least harm to the
fewest people supports the prospect of placing environmental hazards into rural communities, the question of procedural justice still remains. 178 If rural
communities were better equipped to participate in the political process and
voice their opposition, would the substantive inequity still be imposed upon
them based on this utilitarian rationale?
Finally, another question warranting contemplation is whether the recent
proliferation of rural blight is an environmental justice issue. As population
migration and the urbanization trends continue, remaining rural residents are
increasingly saddled with the costs of empty and decaying built infrastructure.
Rural population outmigration has largely resulted from measures pursued in
the name of aggregate welfare, such as liberalized international trade. Leaving
those residents to handle this widespread problem on their own seems like yet
another burden concentrated on a discrete population despite the majority’s
role in creating it.
In sum, rural environmental injustice has generally been overlooked. Yet
the environmental justice framework has unique applicability to the rural context in light of the collective temptation to justify locating environmental hazards in rural places, as well as traditional rural livelihoods’ closer connections
to land-based industrial activity. It may be tempting to dismiss rural environmental injustice as more “natural” or the lesser of two evils when compared to
other forms of environmental injustice. But rationalizing rural environmental
176
See Eisenberg, supra note 127, at 219 (describing a natural gas company’s “military-style”
tactics to “manipulate” communities and their decisionmakers in rural Pennsylvania).
177
See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban
Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2008) (discussing the vulnerability of unincorporated rural
communities).
178
Cf. Roopali Phadke, Public Deliberation and the Geographies of Wind Justice, 22 SCI. AS
CULTURE 247, 247 (2013) (observing that “[r]ural communities at the forefront of new energy development are asking why they are disproportionately being asked to carry the weight of the new carbon
economy while urban residents continue their conspicuous use of energy”); Welton & Eisen, supra
note 165, at 361 (explaining that rural communities are often asked to bear a disproportionate burden
of energy siting simply because their geographic factors make them more attractive or advantageous).

224

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 61:189

injustice based on aggregate welfare raises the same distributive justice concerns as environmental injustice elsewhere. Perhaps the most fundamental
question is whether this form of utilitarianism is recognized for what it is—a
sacrifice of a population “for the greater good,” raising important normative
questions of justice.
Combining economic losses and environmental hazards into their own
distributive justice framework paints a potent picture of “what happened in
rural America.” By highlighting both economic losses and environmental burdens, this framework illuminates important contours of today’s urban-rural
divisions. Many rural communities spent the industrial era caught in a catch22: local employers polluted with impunity, but they were the only source of
economic activity. 179 When the hazardous industries left—as many have in
recent decades—their disappearance did not offer relief, but only a qualitatively different struggle. Declining rural communities today have thus been left
with neither the pristine rural environment of our collective imagination, nor
the once-storied industrial spirit of the American small town. These losses and
burdens shape the modern rural condition for many communities in decline.
III. A DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF THE LAW’S
TREATMENT OF RURAL LIVELIHOODS
This Part applies the framework discussed above in a critique of the law’s
treatment of rural livelihoods for the past several decades. 180 Section A discusses actual distributions of resources to rural communities and argues that
these distributions raise fairness concerns. 181 Section B applies a distributive
justice lens to legal developments in three major sectors of the rural economy. 182 Subsection 1 of Section B critiques the recent evolution of legal regimes
shaping the agricultural sector; 183 Subsection 2 does the same for extractive
industries; 184 and Subsection 3 focuses on manufacturing. 185
A. Inequitable Allocations of Resources as Distributive Injustice
Inequitable distributions of resources to rural communities arise across a
variety of resource types. These range from direct spending to infrastructure
179
See Bell & York, supra note 147, at 112 (explaining how extractive industries continue to both
exploit and maintain the support of rural communities where they operate despite harming the communities’ local environments and no longer providing the jobs they once did).
180
See infra notes 181–320 and accompanying text.
181
See infra notes 186–202 and accompanying text.
182
See infra notes 203–320 and accompanying text.
183
See infra notes 207–243 and accompanying text.
184
See infra notes 244–281 and accompanying text.
185
See infra notes 282–320 and accompanying text.
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development to access to services that may be private, but are nonetheless necessary. Quantifying all of the resource distributions between urban and rural
communities is, of course, difficult to do. Nonetheless, literature and data examining different sectors appear to reveal a pattern of rural communities, as a
whole, being underserved by public, quasi-public, and private providers.
Limited access to broadband internet has perhaps received the most attention of late as an issue of rural communities being unfairly left behind. As of
2019, twenty-six percent of Americans living in rural areas and thirty-two percent of Americans living in Tribal lands lacked access to the Federal Communications Commission’s minimum standard of broadband coverage; only 1.7%
of Americans living in urban areas lacked such coverage. 186 Concerns of inequitable access arise with even more basic needs. Rural schools are disproportionately underfunded. 187 A 2018 report on energy poverty argued that rural
residents’ relatively higher household burden of energy costs “is not a story
about high energy prices,” but one illustrating “historic inequities in the deployment of energy infrastructure” disadvantaging rural households. 188 Compared to their urban counterparts, rural residents received less than fifty percent the rate of annual per capita federal spending from 1994 to 2001 in general. 189 Ample literature establishes a gaping disparity between urban and rural
access to doctors and lawyers. 190 More money is available through private philanthropy in urban areas than in rural areas as well. 191 State-specific studies
have shown that these and other inequities persist throughout the country. 192
Conditions are particularly egregious on Native-American reservations, which
are mostly rural and governed closely by federal agencies; a 2003 report from
186

FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC-19-44, 2019 BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT REPORT 16.
See Anna Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs. Adequacy Debate: Implications for
Rural School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 133, 142, 144 (2003) (discussing disproportionately low spending on rural schools).
188
LAUREN ROSS ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., THE HIGH COST OF
ENERGY IN RURAL AMERICA: HOUSEHOLD ENERGY BURDENS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENERGY
EFFICIENCY 46 (2018), https://aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1806.pdf
[perma.cc/E6D7-SDUM].
189
Federal Development Funding Lower in Rural Areas, Study Finds, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2004/federal-development-fundinglower-in-rural-areas-study-finds [https://perma.cc/ZEH7-KFUP].
190
See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 39, at 306, 323 (discussing rural Americans’ reduced access to
decent education and lawyers); Bauer, supra note 16, at 241 (discussing the uneven ratio of patients to
doctors in rural America and rural residents’ lack of access to rural hospitals); Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth
A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L.
REV. 219, 312 (2010) (explaining inadequate funding of the justice system—including county attorneys and appointed attorneys for indigents—in rural Arizona).
191
See Bauer, supra note 16, at 241.
192
See generally Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 190 (discussing inequities in access to the justice
system for Arizonans living in rural counties).
187
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the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found significant disparities between
funding for tribal needs versus funding for other groups. 193
Some would argue that it is only natural that access to these resources
would be more limited in rural areas. Measures to diffuse virtually any form of
service or development are more expensive per capita outside cities due to the
need to travel longer distances and serve more dispersed populations. For public services, reaching rural communities will strain public coffers, whereas for
private services, providers stand to gain more limited profits.
Although it is true that a less dense population separated by more distance
may be more costly and difficult to serve, the mere idea that rural life is inefficient stymies efforts to even attempt to serve rural communities adequately. 194
These trends raise fundamental questions about the obligation of local,
state, and federal governments to protect those who reside within their boundaries, as well as whether these resource allocations can be deemed “unjust.” 195
In the public sector, it seems difficult to justify not striving harder to meet
basic rural needs. Although few would argue that it would be unjust for a private service provider like a doctor to decline to locate in a rural area, policymakers’ failure to enact programs to promote equitable access to necessary
private services seems just as concerning as disproportionately low public expenditures.
193
See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS
IN INDIAN COUNTRY 116 (2003), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/na0703/na0204.pdf [perma.cc/C9G8-

4KQP] (recommending that all federal agencies administering Native-American programs identify
unmet needs and address immediate requirements for increased funding, including infrastructure development and support for tribal courts); Patrice H. Kunesh, A Call for an Assessment of the Welfare
of Indian Children in South Dakota, 52 S.D. L. REV. 247, 248 (2007) (discussing poverty conditions
on South Dakota reservations and state and federal policymakers’ failure to support necessary services).
194
Bassett, supra note 39, at 283 n.26 (citing JANET M. FITCHEN, ENDANGERED SPACES, ENDURING PLACES: CHANGE, IDENTITY, AND SURVIVAL IN RURAL AMERICA 157–58 (1991)). Fitchen
writes:
The “cost-effectiveness” model and “efficiency” emphasis in human service delivery
has had an increasingly negative impact on distribution of services for low-income residents in rural areas. It is simply more costly to serve small, dispersed populations of
poor people than large, concentrated ones, not only in terms of the obvious higher cost
of transportation but also in that when the service is actually taken out to the more remote areas of the county, there are fewer people there to be served. Because of the
higher per-person cost and the smaller number of persons to be served, decisions are
made at federal, state, and local levels that “we simply cannot afford to serve those rural
areas.”
FITCHEN, supra.
195
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 8, at 485 (describing a 911 operator unable to assist a woman
she heard being murdered over the phone because budgetary cuts had left the local police department
without officers to dispatch).
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Defenders of the status quo will raise two additional arguments to justify
the inequities present in rural Americans’ everyday life. First, rural residents—
the majority of whom are white and (if they vote) conservative—are unlikely
to demand better access to resources through the political process; sociologist
Arlie Hochschild calls poor rural whites’ tendency to vote against expanded
public services “the great paradox.” 196 Second, rural residents in fact benefit
from disproportionately high resources in other contexts. Some note, for instance, that rural regions receive more than they contribute to state and federal
coffers. 197
The first argument raises a variety of questions, but ultimately fails because it is not clear that election outcomes are the only factor that should decide the fate of a region. Perhaps most concerning, these inequitable resource
allocations fall harder on chronically poor rural communities, which are disproportionately people of color who tend to vote for Democrats. 198 Thus, majoritarian mandates cannot be the only measure by which to decide whether
communities need or deserve help. As to the second argument—that rural
communities benefit disproportionately from other resources—they do, in
some contexts. 199 But those resources are almost overwhelmingly designed to
benefit poor people; rural communities benefit disproportionately, for instance,
from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, and unemployment
benefits. 200 In contrast, the resources that rural residents are denied—such as
infrastructure, broadband, and education—tend to be capacity-building re196

HOCHSCHILD, supra note 163, at 5.
Nathan Arnosti & Amy Liu, Why Rural America Needs Cities, BROOKINGS (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-rural-america-needs-cities/ [perma.cc/7YGR-XWY9].
198
HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 67, at 4.
199
See, e.g., Rich Morin et al., A Bipartisan Nation of Beneficiaries, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 18, 2012),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/12/18/a-bipartisan-nation-of-beneficiaries/ [https://perma.cc/
PS2J-8G9A] (stating that rural Americans receive a disproportionate amount of social service entitlements when compared to urban Americans).
200
Julia Foutz et al., The Role of Medicaid in Rural America, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 25,
2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-role-of-medicaid-in-rural-america/ [https://perma.
cc/UWM2-GRFL] (discussing Medicaid coverage in rural America); Tim Marema, The Geography of
Food Stamps, DAILY YONDER (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.dailyyonder.com/geography-foodstamps/2018/12/31/ [https://perma.cc/N67T-K5GK] (illustrating food stamp distribution throughout
the United States); Morin, supra note 199 (discussing Social Security and Medicare); Derek Thompson, 7 Facts About Government Benefits and Who Gets Them, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/12/7-facts-about-government-benefits-and-whogets-them/266428/ [https://perma.cc/6H2Z-TSEC] (illustrating that rural residents are more likely to
receive entitlements generally). Some might argue that farm subsidies are an example of rural communities receiving higher rates of resources, but subsidies in large part flow to the industrialized agriculture operations which this Article criticizes. See Tamar Haspel, Why Do Taxpayers Subsidize Rich
Farmers?, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/why-dotaxpayers-subsidize-rich-farmers/2018/03/15/50e89906-27b6-11e8-b79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html
[https://perma.cc/3LJQ-M4GV].
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sources that can spur economic growth and reduce regional dependency on
direct aid. One must at least ask whether better distributional decisions for dependency-reducing measures might help reduce distributions of resources
geared toward alleviating crises.
Although some characteristics of rural communities may naturally make
them more difficult or costly to serve, policy decisions concerning rural places
are nonetheless infused with value judgments and choices as to which communities merit service and to what extent. In other words, it should not be presumed that rural communities are naturally fated to poverty and struggle. 201
Despite the importance of rural activities to society as a whole, available data
on distributions of resources to rural places in the United States bear out the
idea that they do not enjoy an equitable allocation of critical resources. 202
These inequities alone raise questions of distributive justice.
Ultimately, it remains unclear how the distributional disparities discussed
here can be justified, looking back to the frameworks of justice described
above. Some of the country’s most vulnerable residents live in these underserved areas. It also seems unlikely that their limited access to these resources
is somehow offset or compensated by decisions to direct them elsewhere.
B. Majoritarian-Utilitarian Sacrifice as Distributive Injustice
This Section provides a distributive justice critique of the law and policy
frameworks shaping three key economic sectors that once helped sustain rural
life: agriculture, 203 natural resource extraction, 204 and manufacturing. 205 For
each sector, the discussion highlights (1) major legal developments of the past
several decades; (2) how those legal developments imposed or overlooked
concentrated economic losses and environmental hazards that burdened rural
people and places; and (3) how these policies that undermined rural welfare
were rationalized by service to “the greater good,” yet did not result in gains for
society’s most vulnerable or offsetting measures for the communities affected.

201

Cf. Joel Kotkin & Mark Schill, Where Small Town America Is Thriving, FORBES (Mar. 8,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2018/03/08/where-small-town-america-is-thriving/
#75b8449538b8 [https://perma.cc/9DER-F889] (arguing that “America’s smaller communities are far
more diverse—and have far greater potential—than is commonly believed”).
202
See Steven M. Virgil, Community Economic Development and Rural America: Strategies for
Community-Based Collaborative Development, 20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
9, 16–17 (2010).
203
See infra notes 207–243 and accompanying text.
204
See infra notes 244–281 and accompanying text.
205
See infra notes 282–320 and accompanying text.
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This Section therefore demonstrates how utilitarian thought embodied in decision-making processes effectuated a grand sacrifice of rural communities. 206
1. Agriculture
Agricultural life in the United States has never been easy. In the 1930s,
when farmers accounted for two-thirds of the rural population, high rates of
farm poverty were a problem nationwide, inspiring the first federal interventions into rural poverty. 207 By the 1960s, farmers made up approximately onequarter of the rural population and rural poverty was an issue examined in both

206

In the interest of keeping this Article manageable, this discussion puts aside in-depth consideration of public lands in the American West. Nonetheless, the substantial role public lands play in rural
communities cannot be ignored. The vast majority of land—most of it rural—in many western states
is owned by the federal government and managed by federal agencies. The public lands regime involves a unique legal apparatus that warrants its own consideration. Yet, a synthesis of prior articles
by this author and others suggests that the just transitions and environmental justice analysis is relevant to the public lands as well. First, as the public lands regime transitioned from an “open-access”
model to one focused more on conservation—and therefore curtailed traditional uses such as ranching,
natural resource extraction, and certain tribal rights—it is not clear that policymakers and managers
did enough to make that transition “just.” See Ann M. Eisenberg, Do Sagebrush Rebels Have a Colorable Claim? The Space Between Parochialism and Exclusion in Federal Lands Management, 38 PUB.
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 57, 86 (2017) (contemplating literature suggesting that western rural
communities find agency management to be unclear, inconsistent, and arbitrary, with agencies recognizing property rights in some longstanding uses and not others). This was, of course, after the far
more egregious forced removal of Native Americans. Daniels et al., supra note 37, at 27. As to environmental justice, public lands communities do not bear a disproportionate burden of environmental
hazards. However, they do arguably bear a disproportionate burden of conservation priorities. Although the public lands conserve land, public lands communities still experience the more limited
autonomy associated with rural non-development and the procedural limitations associated with environmental injustice. See Eisenberg, supra, at 87 (contemplating whether rural communities affected
by public lands management experience “reverse environmental justice” because “the rhetoric used to
justify vast public land holdings in the West—that those lands ‘belong to all Americans’—evokes an
analogous subjugation of local will to ‘the greater good’”). See generally Daniels et al., supra note 37
(discussing the need to more deeply consider unequal distributions of burdens in environmental protection, impacts on local economic opportunity, and environmental protection’s limitations on selfdetermination for groups such as Native Americans excluded from public lands). Although critics of
the public lands regime often point to the solicitude afforded to companies in the extractive industry—
and that criticism is well-noted—fewer have observed the effects of public lands management on
individual and community livelihoods. See Stephen R. Miller, As Bundy’s Malheur Takeover Ends,
the Real Concerns of Sagebrush Country Ranchers Linger, LAND USE PROF BLOG (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2016/01/as-bundys-malheur-takeover-ends-the-realconcerns-of-sagebrush-country-ranchers-linger.html [https://perma.cc/46AY-7LVR] (“[S]pecies protection has hit this region hard. . . . [T]here are families that have been farming these federal lands for
generations . . . but do not own it. There is an odd tenant-farmer reality: some of these families have
been here for generations but do not own any land. This creates immense hostility, especially when
new conditions are placed on those permits.”); see generally Chris Armstrong, Sharing Conservation
Burdens Fairly, 33 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 554 (2019).
207
Weber & Miller, supra note 72, at 43–45.
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farm and non-farm contexts. 208 Today, farmers—most of whom also earn nonfarm income—make up less than five percent of the rural population and are
not the main object of poverty-related concern. 209 Farmworkers, by contrast,
face high rates of poverty, difficult working conditions, and other forms of
vulnerability.
Even if the traditional small farm was not the romanticized version seen
on television, commentators focusing on the nexus of the evolution of the agricultural sector and community economic development tend to agree on one
thing: farm consolidation from the mid-twentieth century to the present was
not a positive development for farming communities as a whole. 210
The 1930s saw the creation of the foundation for modern agricultural policy. The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act (the first “Farm Bill”), though
sometimes understood as providing aid to the poor or small farmers, in fact
started the wheels turning toward dramatic farm consolidation over the next
ninety years—tilting the scale in favor of large agribusiness.211 The Farm Bill

208

Id. at 45.
See Bruce Weber & Kathleen Miller, Poverty in Rural America Then and Now, in RURAL
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 10, at 45–46.
210
Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy in a
Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 602 (2010) (explaining that “[f]rom an
economic and social standpoint, non-labor intensive industrial agriculture has led to fewer farmers
producing the vast majority of crops, the virtual disappearance of the traditional family farm, high-risk
working and living conditions for farm laborers, increased production costs, and a decline of economic and social conditions in rural communities”); Coppess, supra note 21, at 370 (noting a complex set
of shifts in farm consolidation as the most notable development since the last major farm economic
crisis in 1980s); Hamilton, Harvesting the Law, supra note 21, at 567 (describing the “Big Ag” period
stemming from the 1980s to the present, with some present-day evolution toward food localism, as
with Community-Supported Agriculture programs); Hamilton, Myth Making, supra note 21, at 10
(discussing how “structural shifts—in land tenure, farm consolidation and livestock production—are
often facilitated by public programs such as farm income support, crop insurance, the RFS, and farm
lending practices”); Mandell, supra note 19, at 101 (observing that the U.S. Department of Agriculture Secretary Butz’s focus “on the mechanization, industrialization, and commoditization of agriculture required larger investments in capital than traditional farming” and that “[t]he increasing need to
invest heavily in equipment, fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides in order to stay competitive meant
that only farmers with access to capital could remain competitive under the new system”); Merrett &
Struthers, supra note 6, at 36; Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 13.
211
Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 14; Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill
for 2007, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 345, 369 (2006). Morrow notes,
209

The farm bill does not subsidize all farmers. Farm bill provisions provide little assistance for or entirely exclude many farmers, crops, regions, and even entire industries
within agriculture. Meanwhile, corporate agriculture receives the bulk of farm bill
funds, putting additional pressure on farm policy intended to preserve small family
farms. The farm bill, in an arbitrary case of line-drawing, focuses on a few commodity
crops.
Morrow, supra, at 369–70.
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has been renewed every five years since its enactment in 1933. 212 Although
initially intended as a modest intervention into crop markets, the Farm Bill is
entangled with nearly all aspects of rural community development. For years,
critics have argued that the Farm Bill serves to “subsidize the expansion of a
mega-farm that puts family farmers out of business.” 213 Even in early Farm
Bills, “farmers, tenants, and sharecroppers were ‘shoved aside in the rush toward bigger units, more tractors, and less men per acre,’” reducing the number
of farmers (both white and black) by approximately one-third by 1945. 214 By
1970, ninety percent of black farmers, who had primarily been located in the
South, were forced out of their agricultural livelihoods and driven northward in
the Great Migration because the U.S. Department of Agriculture facilitated
farm consolidation, mechanization, and various forms of discrimination, such
as withholding loans. 215
Moving forward in history, commentators often point to President Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, as the champion of modern farm consolidation, agricultural industrialization, and the high-volume cultivation of
monoculture cash crops. 216 Others point out, though, that the programs associated with Butz—such as cutting production controls for corn or weakening
supply management that helped control commodity prices and support farm
livelihoods—in fact predate his time in office.217 In any case, the 1970s saw
continued federal support for agricultural industrialization and consolidation,
which arguably became more mainstream during that era.
212
JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45210, FARM BILLS: MAJOR LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS,
1965–2018, at 1 (2018).
213
Daniel Imhoff, Overhauling the Farm Bill: The Real Beneficiaries of Subsidies, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/overhauling-the-farm-billthe-real-beneficiaries-of-subsidies/254422/ [https://perma.cc/LF6W-UTBC].
214
Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 15.
215
Id. Rosenberg and Stucki further explain:

As the civil rights movement gathered steam, assaults on black farmers intensified. By
the 1950s, “any program for small, poverty-ridden farmers in the South became entangled with the civil rights movement.” The founder of the Citizens’ Council drew up a
plan to remove 200,000 African-Americans from Mississippi by 1966 through “the
tractor, the mechanical cotton picker . . . and the decline of the small independent farmers.” As government-funded mechanization continued apace, “tens of thousands” of
poor farmers were forced out of agriculture . . . . Black farmers who held onto their land
used their independence to support civil rights workers, which often made them targets
for lynch mobs and local elites. Throughout the South, USDA agents withheld loans
black farmers needed to operate—amid other discrimination—which continued after the
Civil Rights Act. From 1959 to 1969, black farmers declined by over two thirds, almost
triple the rate of white farmers.
Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
216
E.g., Mandell, supra note 19, at 101.
217
Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 18.
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Most agree that the 1980s farm crisis represented a substantial turning
point in the evolution of modern agriculture. But little modern discussion contemplates the role of the 1980s farm crisis in shaping today’s rural conditions.
This short collective memory masks one of the ongoing contributors to the urban-rural divide; institutions’ manipulation of the farming sector in the 1980s
left deep wounds that have not healed. First, in the 1970s, the Department of
Agriculture, bankers, and university extension offices told farmers that they
must either “get big or get out.” 218 Because the rate of inflation was running
higher than interest rates, institutional lenders, including government lenders
like the Farm Home Administration (FmHA), told farmers to borrow as much
as possible to invest in farmland. 219
By the 1980s, though, the bubble had burst. The Federal Reserve abruptly
reversed course on its lending practices and dictated high interest rates on
loans that the average small farmer simply could not repay. 220 This might not
have destroyed so many small farms on its own, but coupled with reduced crop
subsidies and increased competition from multinational food monopolies’
domination of markets, small farmers were no longer positioned to survive. 221
The fallout from the farm crisis was devastating and widespread. During
the worst period in 1986–1987, almost one million Americans were displaced
from their farms. 222 Years before and after that peak saw between 500,000 and
600,000 farm foreclosures. 223 And many of those farmers were unable or unwilling to “just move” to find new employment. From 1981 to 1988, “more
farmers died from suicide than from any other unnatural cause.”224 Rates of
alcoholism and domestic abuse also rose dramatically. Despite the increase in
mental health issues among farmers spurred on by the farm crisis, provisions
for rural mental health services decreased during the same period. 225
The farm crisis—which many rural residents blamed on public institutions such as the FmHA—reshaped middle-class rural communities, whose
requests for federal help went unheeded. 226 In 1979, five percent of rural coun218

DYER, supra note 20, at 15.
Id.
220
Id. at 2, 15 (explaining how Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker contributed to the 1980s
farm crisis by raising interest rates to temper inflation, which had negative effects for farmers who had
just borrowed substantial amounts to buy additional farmland).
221
Id. at 2.
222
Id. at 15. Rosenberg and Stucki point out, however, that earlier decades had seen substantial
displacement of small farmers, but they came from more marginalized populations and therefore received less attention. Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 19.
223
DYER, supra note 20, at 15.
224
Id. at 4.
225
Id. at 5.
226
Id. at 25 (discussing the Oklahoma governor’s failed efforts to secure federal assistance to
“investigate the actions of the farm lenders and provide additional money for rural mental health”).
219
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ties had an unemployment rate over nine percent. 227 In a mere five years that
rate ballooned: fifty percent of rural counties had unemployment rates exceeding nine percent. 228 The decline of the rural farm town proceeded alongside the
rise of the rural place as the staging site for industrialized agriculture. The
number of farms in the United States dropped by two-thirds between 1935 and
2012, while the average farm size more than doubled. 229 Thus, over the course
of modern history, public institutions facilitated the destruction of this longstanding way of life. Some commentators have proposed that this era planted the
seeds for anti-government militia movements among rural Americans. 230
States have also facilitated the rise of industrialized, consolidated agriculture. Somewhat less dramatically, the proliferation of state right-to-farm laws
over the past several decades has also contributed to the dominance of agribusinesses over small farms and farming communities. Right-to-farm laws
limit nuisance suits involving agriculture. 231 Initially, the laws’ stated rationale
was to preserve farmland. To do so, they raised evidentiary burdens for bringing nuisance actions against farmers. Specifically, “many of the laws adopted a
‘coming to the nuisance’ concept whereby activities that were not a nuisance
when commenced would not become a nuisance due to the changed land uses
of neighbors.” 232 Yet, since their inception, observers have expressed concern
that right-to-farm laws “provide too much protection for agricultural pursuits
and other activities at the expense of neighboring property owners.” 233 Thus,
right-to-farm laws have served as a legal shield of sorts for industrial agriculture.
Although industrial agriculture may not be undesirable per se, the industry’s relationship with rural communities is problematic. Small, family-run
farms are often economically challenging to run, and are far from immune
from ethical concerns such as poor conditions for farmworkers. Nonetheless,
they are likelier to have more symbiotic relationships within communities. 234
The presence of more farms run by more varied farmers provides more work
opportunities, affords farmers more independence, supports families that have
children in schools, and generally benefits the socioeconomic health of a
227

Id. at 17.
Id.
229
Roberto A. Ferdman, The Decline of the Small American Family Farm in One Chart, WASH.
POST (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/16/the-decline-ofthe-small-american-family-farm-in-one-chart/ [https://perma.cc/SXB3-5U7H].
230
E.g., DYER, supra note 20, at 1–7. This theory has been tested empirically and yielded mixed,
unclear results. See JOSHUA D. FREILICH, AMERICAN MILITIAS 110–23 (2003).
231
Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm
Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 87 (2006).
232
Id.
233
Id. at 88.
234
Weber & Miller, supra note 72, at 31.
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community. 235 In other words, the relationship between small farms and communities is symbiotic: each feeds the other.
Large agribusiness operations, by contrast—almost all of which are
owned by white men—have a more parasitic relationship. 236 They bring with
them a “tide [of] adverse social, economic, and environmental impacts” that
reduce the small farmer’s ability to compete. Eventually, the presence of agribusiness in a rural community has the effect of “replacing the independent
farmer with disempowered sharecroppers and destroys the social fabric of
towns.” 237 As corporate landowners consolidate land, they also reduce the
number of decisionmakers contributing to community development, suffocating local autonomy.
Many will defend the rise of industrialized agriculture as necessary to
“scale” agricultural production due to the supposed inefficiency of the small
farm. But this theory confuses the chicken and the egg; it assumes that small
farms have died off because they cannot compete in the “market,” when in
fact, publicly-provided capital, subsidies, and technological incentives have
heavily tilted the scale in favor of industrialized agriculture. 238
Returning to principles of distributive justice, the transformation of agriculture discussed here illustrates several points. First, this transformation looks
like an “unjust transition.” Farm families throughout the twentieth century—
especially farmers of color, but also the vast majority of white farmers—bore a
substantial and disproportionate economic loss compared to the rest of society.
Governmental policies drove them off their land and out of the countryside in
the name of industrialized agriculture. Certainly, some people willingly moved
to cities for a better life—and some of these trends can be attributed to “the
market.” But for the most part, agricultural policy has been detrimental to rural
communities as a whole. The “unjust transition” in the agricultural sector has
been legal institutions’ role in redistributing the wealth and land of small farmers to large agribusinesses—justified in the name of cheaper food for all that
can supposedly “feed the world.” 239
235

See Meredith Redlin & Brad Redlin, Amendment E, Rural Communities and the Family Farm,
49 S.D. L. REV. 787, 787, 792 (2004) (rural communities’ viability and sustainability are connected to
the form of agriculture that surrounds them). Communities with family farms have shown healthier
local economies than those with large-scale corporate farms. Id.
236
Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 19.
237
Randolph C. Canney, Amendment E: A Personal Perspective on Defending Its Constitutionality, 49 S.D. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004).
238
Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 20–21; see Angelo, supra note 210, at 593 (quoting
Michael Pollan, Farmer in Chief, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 12, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/
10/12/magazine/12policy-t.html [https://perma.cc/DA6U-E9NM]).
239
See Hamilton, supra note 22, at 134 (explaining that America never did—nor was ever asked
by other nations—to “feed the world”); Morrow, supra note 211, at 360 (explaining how “[f]arm
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The transformation of agriculture has also imposed environmental hazards on the populations that remain in declining and hollowed-out farm communities. Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) have received
substantial attention in this context.240 Most animals produced for human consumption are now raised in CAFOs. The animals live out their brief lives at
high densities in indoor stalls until they are taken to other facilities for slaughter. 241 CAFO advocates insist that they are an “efficient” means of pursuing
animal agriculture. But CAFO operations also pollute the air and water and
expose neighboring residents to severe public health risks. 242
Both the sacrifice of the rural farm to consolidated agriculture (an economic loss borne inequitably by rural communities) and the sacrifice of the
rural community to ongoing agribusiness pollution (an environmental burden
borne only by rural communities) have been justified in the name of collective
progress and efficiency. Agribusiness’s proponents justify it in the name of
modernization and “feeding the world.”243 Although more recent critiques have
established the disingenuousness and failed track record of food-abundance
rationales, public institutions have embraced them while also failing to address
the associated challenges for rural communities. Thus, the law’s role in shaping the agricultural sector has facilitated the sacrifice of rural communities in
the name of the aggregate welfare through concentrated economic losses and
environmental burdens.
2. Extractive Industries
Natural resource extraction was historically another major source of economic activity for rural communities. In recent decades, this sector has contracted, contributing to a downward spiral for communities that depended on

programs increase the price of farm land while providing a disproportionate share of subsidies to
large-scale farming operations, thus undermining rural economic development”).
240
E.g., Wendee Nicole, CAFOs and Environmental Justice: The Case of North Carolina, 121
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A 182, A 183 (2013).
241
JoAnn Burkholder et al., Impacts of Waste from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations on
Water Quality, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 308, 308 (2007).
242
See Kaitlin Kelly-Reif & Steve Wing, Urban-Rural Exploitation: An Underappreciated Dimension of Environmental Injustice, 47 J. RURAL STUD. 350, 355–57 (2016) (discussing health outcomes
associated with pork industry); Michelle B. Nowlin, Sustainable Production of Swine: Putting Lipstick
on a Pig?, 37 VT. L. REV. 1079, 1096 (2013) (explaining that “economists and scientists have concluded
swine CAFOs ‘contribute to economic marginalization of workers and socioeconomic decline in rural
communities’” and are also “unsustainable from environmental and public health perspectives”); Industrial Animal Agriculture: A Broken System, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (July 2011), https://www.pewtrusts.
org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2011/07/19/industrial-animal-agriculture-a-broken-system
[https://perma.cc/9JSR-X6HK].
243
See Hamilton, supra note 22, at 134.
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it. 244 Thus, an understanding of modern rural decline and related unfairness
requires an examination of rural communities’ relationships with extractive
industries and how the law has shaped those relationships. Although extractive
industries are diverse—including industries such as forestry, fishing, natural
gas and oil drilling, and gold mining—coal miners are often held out as the
face of the so-called “urban-rural divide.” 245 This Subsection focuses on coal
in Appalachia. 246 The Appalachian experience may be unique in some ways,
but it illustrates a perfect storm of environmental justice and just transitions
issues. The issues seen in Appalachia are also reflected in other rural communities, including coal communities elsewhere and rural communities reliant on
other extractive industries. 247
The failure of the state and federal legal apparatus to prevent or remedy
Appalachian problems, and the many benefits the country has reaped from Appalachian exploitation, speak to the burdens Appalachia has borne in the name
of aggregate welfare. In his book Ramp Hollow, historian Steven Stoll argues
that the subjugation of Appalachia was neither an accident nor an unfortunate
tragedy along the way to industrialization. 248 He characterizes the nineteenthcentury “scramble for Appalachia” as embedded in “the idea that historical
progress required taking land away from agrarians and giving it to others.” 249
Residents of Appalachia in the nineteenth century were mostly subsistence farmers, but many did not own the land they used for survival. Politicians
living in the North and East owned the titles to large stretches of Appalachian
land, and for a time turned a blind eye to the tens of thousands of squatters that
244

See generally Eisenberg, supra note 24.
See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 17, at 1495–98 (discussing how the plight of the coal miner has
been used to rebut those pushing for environmental reforms and explaining how the loss of jobs in the
coal mining industry has been a “rallying cry” for those opposed to government regulations).
246
In the current discourse on coal, the face of “the coal miner” is often a white Appalachian.
Yet, other coal-producing regions may be geographically, racially, and legally distinct, while also
facing similar issues related to environmental hazards and economic dependency. A substantial number of Native tribes and reservations rely on coal mines or coal-fired power plants as their main
sources of livelihoods. Many of these tribes also decry the so-called “war on coal.” As mines and
plants have closed, the impact on diverse communities has been difficult. See Ramo & Behles, supra note
87, at 515; Terry Anderson, The Native American Coal War, FORBES (May 18, 2016), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/05/18/the-native-american-coal-war/#d1d8a867fb40 [https://perma.cc/
RYR7-V3CW]; Turkewitz, supra note 87.
247
Most recently, both environmental and economic distributive injustice concerns surrounding
the use of high-volume hydraulic fracturing to extract natural gas and oil from shale have mostly been
confined to rural areas in Appalachia and elsewhere. See Eisenberg, supra note 127, at 209–26 (discussing inequitable environmental hazards and economic costs of Marcellus and Utica shale gas drilling, partially underlying Appalachia); Elena Pacheco, Note, It’s a Fracking Conundrum: Environmental Justice and the Battle to Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 373, 380–85 (2015).
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See generally STOLL, supra note 83.
249
Id. at xiv–xv.
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claimed adverse possession to subsections of those many acres. 250 Motivated
by a burgeoning anti-“mountain people” sentiment, however, and supported by
the courts, elite title-holders were mostly able to evict residents from the land
on which the residents had built homes, cultivated farms, and formed communities. 251
Appalachians have since experienced a consistent history of limited access to ownership interests in the land they worked and lived on or near. 252
Even this early evolution bore environmental justice implications, as regional
residents had already lost autonomy and the prospect of self-determination. 253
Some commentators continue to point to Appalachia’s geographic isolation as
an explanation for its persistent regional poverty. 254 But this isolation narrative
discounts other key factors that have shaped Appalachian poverty, namely, this
initial land dispossession and the subsequent arrival of the extractive industry. 255
Those regional residents who were able to acquire land remained vulnerable to the loss of another form of property: mineral rights. The agents of nineteenth-century speculators in natural resources were “men of great guile and
charm” who would take advantage of regional residents’ limited literacy and
access to information. 256 Due to this unequal bargaining power, regional residents’ interests in their timber and minerals “were virtually given away.” 257
With so much land and so many minerals owned by powerful out-of-state ac250

Id. at 10 (explaining that “[a]s long as political elites pretended not to see the flaunting of
private property and constitutional authority, they could continue to believe that the interests of the
backwoods aligned with those of the nation-state”).
251
Id. at 9–16.
252
See, e.g., BETH SPENCE ET AL., W. VA. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY, WHO OWNS WEST VIRGINIA? 7 (2013), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/wvcbp/pages/468/attachments/original/
1511177697/land-study-paper-final3.pdf?1511177697 [https://perma.cc/4CAE-7KQJ].
253
Cf. Daniels et al., supra note 37, at 64–65. The loss of autonomy like that seen in Appalachia
is among the themes shaping rural environmental injustice. New Mexico, for example—currently
considered the poorest state in the nation—experienced a similar land grab in the nineteenth century,
when unscrupulous speculators used similar tactics to dispossess residents of their land. Ann M. Eisenberg, Land Shark at the Door? Why and How States Should Regulate Landmen, 27 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 179 (2016). Parallels also exist with the experience of African-American farmers
in the South, and Native Americans removed by the U.S. government. The loss of control over land
renders communities vulnerable to outsiders shaping the future of their land uses and socioeconomic
development. See generally STOLL, supra note 83 (arguing that the enclosure of land and land dispossession are central to the history of capitalism and the rise of socioeconomic inequality).
254
STOLL, supra note 83, at 17; Nicholas F. Stump & Anne Marie Lofaso, De-Essentializing
Appalachia: Transformative Socio-Legal Change Requires Unmasking Regional Myths, 120 W. VA.
L. REV. 823, 825–29 (2018).
255
See generally STOLL, supra note 83.
256
HARRY M. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS: A BIOGRAPHY OF A DEPRESSED
AREA 63 (1963).
257
Id. at 73–75; see STOLL, supra note 83, at 35 (describing a West Virginia farmer and civic
leader lamenting that “this great natural wealth went into the hands of syndicates for a nominal sum
and was lost to the people”).
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tors, the stage was thus set by the mid-nineteenth century for a corporate takeover of Appalachia. 258
Appalachian coal mining began in earnest in the nineteenth century. In
turn, the state and federal legal apparatus served to funnel local residents into
the coal labor machine, to give the coal industry a mandate to pollute freely,
and to deprive local residents of opportunities for redress. 259 The Battle of
Blair Mountain in 1921 was a turning point in the evolution of Appalachian
society. Coal miners, growing intolerant of inhumane working and living conditions, rose up against mine operators when their efforts to unionize were
suppressed. After federal troops intervened, the miners alone were tried, and
organized labor in the coalfields suffered a long-lasting blow. 260
In more recent history, Pat McGinley highlights how the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) involved a “broken promise”
to protect coalfield communities. 261 Before the act, unregulated mining practices exacted significant environmental harms in Appalachia. 262 During those
years, mining states engaged in a race to the bottom. Although some attribute
this to the legislatures’ desire to remain competitive through lax regulatory
oversight, states such as West Virginia seemed generally beholden to industrial
interests. 263 Public outcry in the 1960s reached “a crescendo.” The SMCRA
introduced a set of federal regulations designed to address problems associated
258
Cf. STOLL, supra note 83, at 27 (describing “the industrial invasion of Appalachia” as “slow
violence that brought an end to agrarian autonomy in places like West Virginia”).
259
See Brandon Nida, Demystifying the Hidden Hand: Capital and the State at Blair Mountain,
47 HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY 52, 54 (2013).
260
Id. at 63.
261
Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to Mountaintop Removal: Environmental Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL. L. 21, 54 (2004); see Nicholas F. Stump, Mountain
Resistance: Appalachian Civil Disobedience in Critical Legal Research Modeled Law Reform, 41
ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 69, 107–14 (2017) (describing acts of civil disobedience by Appalachians in response to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act).
262
McGinley, supra note 261, at 48–49. McGinley writes,

The most visible adverse impacts of coal strip mining were the scars gashed in Appalachian mountainsides. Surface mining strips away forest vegetation, causing erosion and
attendant stream sedimentation and siltation, accompanied by negative impacts on
aquatic life and drinking water supplies. In some coalfield regions, iron-laden sulphuric
acid mine drainage pollution from underground mining produces red-orange stained
stream beds and renders watercourses ecologically sterile. . . . [M]ining contaminated or
depleted underground aquifers that provide domestic and farm water supplies to many
coalfield families. Loud noise and dust from blasting and earth-moving activities disturb nearby communities and wildlife. . . . Landslides caused by indiscriminate dumping of mine spoil downslope on steep Appalachian mountainsides buried cars, homes,
and sometimes killed people.
Id.
263

Id. at 50; Nida, supra note 259, at 54.
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with mining, and also created the Office of Surface Mining. 264 The SMCRA
reduced the disastrous effects of mining pre-1977, but not enough, even today,
to fully mitigate the adverse environmental, economic, and social impacts the
industry has imposed on coalfield communities. 265
Another prominent example of policymakers’ failure to address Appalachian environmental injustice is the law’s treatment of black lung. According to
relatively recent investigative reports, black lung—a preventable but often fatal
disease that afflicts coal miners—has seen a resurgence among coal miners. 266
Reporters argued that both the coal industry and federal oversight of safety regulations failed to protect miners from the coal dust that causes black lung. 267 Despite this failure, the federal government has approved a mere 7.6% of miners’
applications for black lung benefits.268
U.S. society benefited from the sacrifice of Appalachia’s land and people,
and coal production has often been lauded for its collective benefits. The
American industrial revolution was powered by coal from West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and Kentucky; coal-fired power accounted for virtually all manufacturing on the eastern seaboard after 1850. 269 Coal continues to comprise a
substantial portion of the U.S. energy mix, and many still view it as a cheap
source of energy with a handful of regrettable consequences.270 Notwithstanding the gains the country has reaped from the sacrifice of Appalachia, the
widespread environmental justice issues have yet to be remedied.
Despite the many harms the extractive industry brought to Appalachia,
the decline of coal did its own damage. This shift also cannot be dismissed
purely as a private phenomenon unworthy of public intervention. Many point
to lowered costs of extracting one of coal’s main competitors, natural gas, with
the advent of high-volume hydraulic fracturing technology. 271 But the full story
also involves increased environmental regulations, “including the Transport
Rule, Mercury Air Toxics Standards, and the Clean Power Plan,” which have

264

McGinley, supra note 23, at 307.
McGinley, supra note 261, at 54.
266
Heather Willard, Black Lung Cases Soar, Senators Seek to Curb Rise, LOGAN DAILY NEWS
(Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.logandaily.com/news/black-lung-cases-soar-senators-seek-to-curb-rise/
article_3f27bd80-50e1-5af6-bdd3-d2eaade1341a.html [https://perma.cc/7XPM-YF2J].
267
Howard Berkes, As Mine Protections Fail, Black Lung Cases Surge, NPR (July 9, 2012),
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=155978300 [https://perma.cc/B2MEQCZY].
268
Brian C. Murchison, Due Process, Black Lung, and the Shaping of Administrative Justice, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (2002).
269
STOLL, supra note 83, at 34.
270
McGinley, supra note 23, at 307.
271
Revesz, supra note 17, at 1550; see RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR
AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE “WAR ON COAL” 141, 146–54 (2016).
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also had an effect on the industry. 272 Because of these and other factors, coal’s
market share of the U.S. energy mix dropped from fifty percent in 2009 to thirty-four percent in 2012. 273 Professor McGinley concludes “that few in the conservation/environmental community, the coal and power industries, nor leaders
of any political stripe are advocating planning and action to address the reality
of declining coal production in central Appalachia and what it portends for
coalfield communities.” 274
The causes of the decline of coal are the subject of much debate. For the
most part, this debate is framed as a classic “jobs versus environment” tension,
which tends to fall along political lines or urban-versus-rural ones. Pro-coal
commentators insist that measures such as the Obama administration’s Clean
Power Plan would have direct impacts on mining communities’ livelihoods.275
Those who support a policy of reducing carbon emissions often insist that coal
has declined and will decline for other reasons—such as automation and competition from natural gas. 276
More recently, prominent environmental scholars have acknowledged that
environmental regulations may indeed have adverse economic consequences for
discrete populations.277 This is an important step. By insisting that market causes
alone have killed coal—and that therefore, the socioeconomic decline and increased vulnerability of coal communities is acceptable—environmentalists undermine their own cause. The nation’s energy supply has always been crafted
by policy. Direct subsidies, tax benefits, and the aforementioned lax regulatory
regime have paved the way for fossil fuels to dominate for the past two hundred years. Wind-generated energy, for example, requires major up-front investments that would likely deter investors, but for the investment incentives
crafted by state and federal policymakers.
The claim that coal’s decline “just happened” rings somewhat hollow
when considered in this light. Congress’s decision to barely regulate natural
gas was intentional. 278 Coal’s decline cannot simply be attributed to “natural
causes”; rather, government policies allowed—and at times actively contributed to—the industry’s decline. It is possible to recognize this decline as a difficulty for coalfield communities while also celebrating the decline’s implica272

Revesz, supra note 17, at 1550; see REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 271, at 141, 146–54.
McGinley, supra note 23, at 308.
274
Id. at 311.
275
See generally Ann M. Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation in Social-Ecological Systems,
47 ENVTL. L. 127 (2017).
276
Id.
277
Revesz, supra note 17, at 1493–98. See generally BEYOND ZERO-SUM ENVIRONMENTALISM
(Sarah Krakoff et al. eds., 2019) (discussing tradeoffs and “winners and losers” of environmental
policies).
278
Eisenberg, supra note 127, at 207–08.
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tions for better carbon emissions policy. But failing to acknowledge the role of
public decisionmakers in both creating and abandoning the coalfields leaves
those communities “forgotten”—or better put, sacrificed once to produce energy, then sacrificed anew in the name of a clean environment for everyone. 279
The Appalachian story is often framed as unique. Although it might be a
particularly extreme example, other rural communities have been trapped in
similar relationships with extractive industries, growing dependent on the very
industries harming them. 280 Thus, when the industries have declined, in the
absence of sound transitional policy—which is often lacking in the
“boom/bust” scenarios associated with natural resource extraction—the communities are left with little.281 In either case, the unsubtle harms to the environment and the people paint a picture of a knowing collective sacrifice of the
rural population, as do the unmitigated economic losses.
3. Manufacturing
Manufacturing is a third sector that has historically been one of the few
lifelines sustaining the rural way of life. Although deindustrialization has affected urban centers, rural communities have been disproportionately dependent on manufacturing and are more likely to lack other opportunities when
plants close. 282 As is the case with natural resource extraction and agriculture,
the law’s treatment of the manufacturing sector over the past several decades
has raised both environmental justice and just transitions concerns in relation
to rural welfare.
Much has been written about the rash of manufacturing plant closures of
the 1980s and 1990s. 283 With the advent of the North Atlantic Free Trade

279
Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 275, at 147 (discussing populist alienation from the federal environmental law apparatus).
280
See Karen Clay & Alex Weckenman, When Are Resources Curses and Blessings? Evidence
from the United States 1880–2012, at 2, 4–7 (Dec. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author).
281
In the past several years, federal efforts have been made to assist Appalachian coal communities,
but it is not clear what their impact stands to be. See Ann M. Eisenberg, As the Coal Industry Shrinks,
Miners Deserve a Just Transition—Here’s What It Should Include, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://theconversation.com/as-the-coal-industry-shrinks-miners-deserve-a-just-transition-heres-what-itshould-include-116340 [https://perma.cc/NNE5-RHFL].
282
Anderson, supra note 8, at 467–68; see Nico Thomas & Steve Campbell, The Geography of
Manufacturing: The Case of MEP and Rural Manufacturers, NIST MANUFACTURING INNOVATION
BLOG (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nist.gov/blogs/manufacturing-innovation-blog/geography-manufacturing-case-mep-and-rural-manufacturers [https://perma.cc/PF4X-VQCM] (“When there are downturns in manufacturing the economic impacts disproportionately affect rural communities.”).
283
See, e.g., Fran Ansley, Inclusive Boundaries and Other (Im)possible Paths Toward Community Development in A Global World, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 415 (2001); Ansley, supra note 26, at
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Agreement (NAFTA) under the Clinton administration, as well as other
measures such as the treaty creating the World Trade Organization, many
longstanding manufacturing plants opted to relocate to places where labor was
cheaper and regulations were laxer. 284 As this swift change spread throughout
the country, mass layoffs displaced workers, and, in some instances, entire
towns. 285
Yet, both then and now, the displacement issue has remained at the periphery. 286 Today, little nuanced commentary seeks to understand the ongoing
ramifications of widespread deindustrialization. 287 Most sum up this phase as
historical background, with a handful of words—globalization, deindustrialization, or outsourcing of jobs, for instance. Little modern scholarship harkens
back to the specific measures that purported to address the large-scale displacement of the many workers and communities whose livelihoods had
evolved over time around the manufacturing sector. 288 With the benefit of
hindsight, it seems clear that the federal legal measures implemented to minimize workers’ losses could hardly be called a good-faith effort. 289
One of those federal efforts was the Trade Adjustment Act of 1974
(TAA). The TAA attempted to offset the effects of reduced trade restrictions on
workers and communities. 290 The Act provided compensation for lost wages
and job retraining for workers who could make a showing that their losses
1758–62; Leslie Kay & Kevin Griffin, Plant Closures: Assessing the Victims’ Remedies, 19
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 199, 199–200 (1983).
284
See Sara Dillon, Getting the “Message” on Free Trade: Globalization, Jobs and the World
According to Trump, 16 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 16–17 (2018).
285
See Virginia L. Duquet, Note, Advantages and Limitations of Current Employee Ownership
Assistance Acts to Workers Facing a Plant Closure, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 93, 93 (1984) (explaining that
“[j]ob loss is a harsh reality or an ominous threat facing many American workers” and stating that
“[i]n many instances, a plant closure not only affects individual employees, but also can devastate an
entire community”).
286
See Dillon, supra note 284, at 14, 44 (explaining how commentators and writers did not focus
on the problem of job loss caused by globalization, and faulting the “silence of elites” for allowing the
perception in rural America that the country’s leaders are indifferent to their hardship).
287
See id.
288
UW-WHITEWATER FISCAL & ECON. RESEARCH CTR. & REDEVELOPMENT ECON., THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACT OF WISCONSIN’S BROWNFIELDS INVESTMENTS 19 (Nov. 2015) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS INVESTMENTS], https://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Brownfields/documents/bsg/uwwreport.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3K62-LWUG]. But see Dillon, supra note 284, at 2 (acknowledging that job
losses are associated with a globalized economy).
289
See Dillon, supra note 284, at 14 (arguing that “this explosive issue was broadly ignored”
from the 1990s onward, and that elites such as trade law attorneys focused on technical legal questions
that were a “side show” for regular people).
290
Shana Fried, Note, Strengthening the Role of the U.S. Court of International Trade in Helping
Trade-Affected Workers, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 747, 749 (2006). President Kennedy’s Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 technically created the trade adjustment assistance program, but commentators agree that
this was not a meaningful avenue for worker benefits until the 1974 amendment relaxed eligibility
criteria. Id.
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stemmed from international competition.291 The Department of Labor administers the TAA, and continues to hear petitions from workers claiming displacement today. Diverse industries are affected by international competition. But
the vast majority of claims come from employers and workers in the manufacturing sector. 292 Since the start of the program, several million workers have
taken advantage of it. 293
Although preferable to inaction, the Act has been criticized as failing to
provide adequate compensation for workers’ and communities’ losses. Economists disagree about its overall effects. Some argue that it is “reasonably effective as compensation,” though perhaps not as a means for effective retraining
or relocation assistance. 294 Critics cite studies illustrating that by transitioning
to the program, the average worker loses approximately thirty percent of his or
her wages. These workers are also unlikely to ever find jobs that pay as well or
have benefits comparable to the work they lost. 295 Of importance to the aging
rural population, the program proves least effective for older workers who
have been in their particular industry for an extended period.
In the 1980s and 1990s, a social movement arose in response to the only
partially mitigated trend of large-scale displacement. This movement was due,
at least in part, to TAA’s inability to account for all losses—particularly where
entire communities were displaced.296 Activists agitated for private and public
recognition of the economic upheaval that plant closures effectuated. 297 Some
modest judicial and legislative gains came from the plant-closure movement.
But for the most part, deindustrialization was swift, and its fallout only minimally addressed through law. 298
Among those modest successes was the 1988 Worker Adjustment, Retraining and Notification Act (WARN Act) that was passed in response to
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Id. at 749–51.
Tom DiChristopher, Sizing up the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, CNBC (June 26,
2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/26/is-aid-to-trade-displaced-workers-worth-the-cost.html [https://
perma.cc/N4JX-CGX9].
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Id.
294
Id.
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Id.; see Kara Reynolds & John Palatucci, Does Trade Adjustment Assistance Make a Difference? 13 (Am. Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2008-12, 2008) (stating that “TAA workers
earned on average 30 percent less than they made at their previous job”).
296
Cf. Ansley, supra note 283, at 415 (discussing the need for social movements to highlight
issues of “economic justice and [that social movements are] capable of carrying on the best of what
we began in the plant-closing campaigns of past decades, yet also capable of going significantly beyond the old [social movements] in their awareness of the highly asymmetrical global system and
their openness to the claims of the excluded and oppressed”).
297
See id. at 367–69.
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Id. at 353–55; Dillon, supra note 284, at 12–14.
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widespread plant closures with the goal of aiding dislocated workers. 299 Yet,
even from its inception, critics were skeptical that the WARN Act would meaningfully address the vulnerability associated with layoffs. The Act’s language
was vague and unclear, raising difficulties in application. 300 Perhaps most
egregiously, the WARN Act required only that employers with one hundred or
more employees provide sixty days’ advance notice of a planned closing or
“mass layoff” of fifty employees or more. 301
The deindustrialization trend is thus arguably the least subtle example of
an unjust transition from traditional rural livelihoods. Although the U.S. economy enjoyed a net boom from the swift and unmitigated measures that undermined this rural economic lifeline, many small communities dependent on one
major employer were essentially destroyed. 302 Today’s ghost towns—
communities that have ceased to exist due to full-scale out-migration and
abandonment—can often trace their death directly back to a plant closure.
These losses were distributed to urban centers as well. But rural communities’
dependency on manufacturing, lack of alternatives, and the subsequent proliferation of rural blight all suggest that rural communities bore a disproportionate burden of these economic losses. And these losses were generally justified
in the name of “progress” or the aggregate welfare.
Like resource extraction and agribusiness, rural manufacturing brought
environmental degradation in addition to economic losses. Rural environmental justice concerns surrounding manufacturing manifested both before and
after deindustrialization. Although rural manufacturing pollution is understudied, examples such as West Virginia’s “Chemical Valley” in the Kanawha
River Valley and Louisiana’s “Cancer Alley” in a rural, black community outside Baton Rouge illustrate both substantive and procedural rural environmental justice concerns arising from manufacturing. 303
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Ethan Lipsig & Keith R. Fentonmiller, A WARN Act Road Map, 11 LAB. LAW. 273, 273

(1996).
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Id.
29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2018); see Ansley, supra note 283, at 372 n.33 (recognizing that the passage of the WARN Act was a victory for the plant-closure social movement, but calling it an “extremely limited” protection for displaced workers).
302
See generally Peter Cole, A Tale of Two Towns: Globalization and Rural Deindustrialization
in the U.S., 12 WORKINGUSA 539 (2009) (comparing the experiences of two rural communities that
lost major employers after NAFTA and observing the range of small-town suffering from minimal to
severe).
303
Victor Blackwell et al., Toxic Tensions in the Heart of ‘Cancer Alley,’ CNN (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/20/health/louisiana-toxic-town/index.html [https://perma.cc/EAK8S4DJ]; Laura Parker, A Century of Controversy, Accidents in West Virginia’s Chemical Valley in
Lead-up to Spill, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 16, 2014), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2014/01/140116-chemical-valley-west-virginia-chemical-spill-coal/ [https://perma.cc/KM4W-8A7E].
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For almost one hundred years, the Kanawha River Valley hosted the nation’s largest concentration of chemical plants, achieving “a degree of global
infamy” over the years because of accidents and explosions.304 In 2014, a
chemical spill contaminated drinking water for more than 200,000 people in
nine counties in West Virginia for an extended period. 305 But even before the
spill, “it was not unusual to find black water running from kitchen faucets” in
the area, “[o]r to see children with chronic skin rashes. Or bathtub enamel eaten away, leaving locals to wonder what the same water was doing to their
teeth.” 306 Local residents have spent decades attempting to use the law to protect themselves, but have achieved few successes.
“Cancer Alley,” Louisiana, has had a similar story. The small town of LaPlace, Louisiana, is one of the rural communities alongside the series of plants
on the road from New Orleans to Baton Rouge. In a town surrounded by dozens of petrochemical plants, a sign posted by activists warns residents that they
are “more likely to get cancer due to chloroprene air emissions.” 307 According
to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), residents in this community
“face the highest risk in the country of developing cancer from air toxins.” 308
Like in the Kanawha River Valley, residents have used a variety of legal strategies to fight the plants over the years, with few improvements to show for it.
After deindustrialization, brownfields and property vacancy have perhaps
become the more widespread rural environmental justice concerns, which affect former manufacturing communities but also others that have lost population. 309 When plants left communities, they left their built infrastructure behind. These leftover buildings may be contaminated, highly expensive to address, and the most dominant feature of a rural town. 310 Although the EPA’s
brownfields program provides assistance for rural communities to remediate
such sites, the scale of today’s rural property vacancy, abandonment, and dilapidation suggests that many rural communities are fending for themselves in
dealing with this burden. 311 Due to their size, more limited land use regula304
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tions, and other socioeconomic challenges, the task of remediation is naturally
harder for rural communities. 312 Where problem properties remain, they act
both as a hazardous impediment to healthy environments and as an ongoing
symbol of economic loss. 313
To summarize, the overall theme in the legal regimes shaping key rural
livelihoods over the past several decades is a pattern of decisionmakers choosing to trade rural welfare for some other perceived benefits. The Federal Reserve, the FmHA, Congress, and state legislatures opted to facilitate the rise of
agribusiness to the detriment of the small farmer. These acts concentrated economic losses and environmental burdens on rural communities in the name of
cheap, abundant food. The SMCRA and natural gas regulations have been
weak, while measures to mitigate the decline of extractive jobs have been minimal; the former measures were justified by cheap, reliable energy, while the
latter inaction has been justified by environmental benefits. And plants were
permitted to abruptly close up shop despite entire towns’ reliance on them.
Meanwhile rural residents have been left to deal with a widespread rise in vacant, abandoned, or contaminated industrial and residential buildings. In each
of these sectors, the law led to rural communities’ disproportionate share of
economic losses and substantial environmental burdens. This analysis shows
that it is not accurate to suggest that the rural America in decline “died” or
“was forgotten.” The public used rural America for gain; rural America was
sacrificed, and that sacrifice is on the public’s conscience.
One might be tempted to argue that at least some rural residents have
brought these scenarios on themselves. According to some, rural residents
should now be left to reap what they have sown by “voting against their interests.” 314 Put more mildly, others argue that it is condescending to second-guess
RURAL SOC. 1, 22–23 (2019) (discussing findings suggesting that dilapidated housing stock is prevalent in small towns, that small towns face particular difficulties in remediating property issues “where
scale, demand, and limited financial and human capital resources are barriers to maintaining and improving local housing conditions,” and that more research is needed to understand strategies to address blighted properties in small towns); Sylvia Carignan, EPA Cleanup Grants Divide Urban, Rural
Communities, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (June 18, 2018), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/
environment-and-energy/epa-cleanup-grants-divide-urban-rural-communities [https://perma.cc/9MB4GW6L] (suggesting that EPA grant application process for brownfield redevelopment may disadvantage rural communities); see also EPA, BROWNFIELDS AND LAND REVITALIZATION IN SMALL,
RURAL, AND TRIBAL COMMUNITIES (2019) https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-09/
documents/final_small_rural_tribal_508compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/734D-VP4Y].
312
See generally Ann M. Eisenberg, Addressing Rural Blight: Lessons from West Virginia and
WV LEAP, 24 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 513 (2016); Eisenberg, supra note 5.
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Cf. UW-WHITEWATER FISCAL & ECON. RESEARCH CTR. & REDEVELOPMENT ECON., supra
note 288.
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Cf. CATTE, supra note 116, at 21 (“Following Trump’s victory, pundits often engaged in a
projection of a . . . fantasy, one where Appalachia might be isolated and left to reap what it had
sown.”); Frank Rich, No Sympathy for the Hillbilly, DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 20, 2017),
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rural preferences as they are expressed at the voting booth. There is, perhaps,
some truth to the idea that anti-tax, anti-government sentiment in some places
has contributed to rural infrastructural decline or the persistence of hazardous
industries. 315 Residents fail to vote for the higher taxes that might help promote
local safeguards, vote against land-use planning, and at times enthusiastically
embrace these hazardous industries when they come calling. 316
But blithe dismissals of the challenges illuminated above fail to account
for several key points. First, in each of these sectors, literature on rural social
movements indicates that rural communities have often attempted to expel
these hazardous industries or improve their working and living conditions, only to have those efforts crushed. 317 Second, a robust body of literature demonstrates that rural needs are often excluded from policy making. 318 Points one
and two suggest that there is more complexity to rural participation in the political process than electoral maps reveal. Limited access to information and
other resources may facilitate some rural residents’ complicity in their own
disenfranchisement. 319 Finally, literature on structural inequality suggests that
one ought to pause and dig deeper before blaming marginalized groups for
their own marginalization. 320
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318
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Culture, It’s American Culture, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
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IV. CONTEMPLATING EQUITABLE RURAL REFORM
Having laid a foundation to characterize rural distributive injustice, this
Part briefly addresses the “what should be done about it” question, leaving further explication for future projects. It suggests that achieving distributive justice for rural America requires either: (1) addressing inequity across the
board—rural and non-rural—through a more just distribution of resources for
everyone, or (2) pursuing remedial considerations specific to rural communities.321
Addressing inequity generally is perhaps the more straightforward way to
address rural distributive injustice. Other communities delineated along nongeographic lines, such as race, have experienced comparable or worse inequities, as have marginalized urban communities. To prioritize rural communities
in zero-sum allocations of resources would raise its own questions of justice.
Yet, helping everyone would help rural communities. The loss of rural
livelihoods would not be felt so acutely if unemployment did not make people
so vulnerable to housing insecurity, health problems, and bankruptcy. Similarly, the loss of rural jobs and the destruction of the rural environment would not
be so problematic if people had the means to relocate or afford medical care.
Far-reaching legislation such as the proposed “Green New Deal” would help
rectify inequities stemming from limited access to decent work and a decent
environment.

321

Although not contemplated in depth here, increasing access to mobility is another avenue
worth exploring for potentially mitigating rural vulnerability. For an exchange on impediments to
mobility “in regions where it is needed most,” see generally Sheila R. Foster, The Limits of Mobility
and the Persistence of Urban Inequality, 127 YALE L.J. F. 480 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.
org/pdf/Foster_styrqpy4.pdf [https://perma.cc/E666-NEU6] (discussing urban inequality and racial/economic stratification as impediments to mobility); Sara Pratt, Civil Rights Strategies to Increase
Mobility, 127 YALE L.J. F. 498 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Pratt_wkyqnv49.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9ADS-RX9X] (discussing civil rights-based impediments to mobility); Schleicher,
supra note 2 (discussing responses to the impediments); David Schleicher, Surreply: How and Why
We Should Become Un-Stuck!, 127 YALE L.J. F. 571 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org
/pdf/Schleicher_24qnzowt.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9TA-XBUM] (acknowledging racial discrimination
and segregation as impediments to mobility while arguing against the “false hope” that policy can
revive declining areas); Naomi Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of
Place, 127 YALE L.J. F. 458 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Schoenbaum_dyqnw2cu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/36SZ-QRZ4]; Alec MacGillis, The Coal Industry Is Dying, and It’s Leaving Communities Like This One to Pick Up the Pieces, MOTHER JONES (May 28, 2018), https://www.mother
jones.com/environment/2018/05/the-coal-industry-is-dying-and-its-leaving-communities-like-this-oneto-pick-up-the-pieces/ [https://perma.cc/FZ8G-USDS] (highlighting how fewer Americans moved in
2017 than in any year dating back to the 1950s, and offering New York Times columnist David
Brook’s explanation as to the reason why: people no longer have confidence in the economy). Another
topic for further discussion is Revesz’s more general idea that distributional concerns should factor
more heavily into government regulation. Revesz, supra note 17, at 1555.
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The Green New Deal, although not fully defined as of this writing, would
pursue a massive jobs program geared toward creating economic opportunity
while also weaning the country from fossil fuels. 322 Alternative measures to
address inequity, such as universal basic income, a federal guarantee of employment, single-payer healthcare, and free, high-quality education would also
help to rectify the concerns outlined in this Article. One might be tempted to
dismiss this option as politically or economically unrealistic. But similar initiatives have been pursued in the past, and ongoing consideration of legislation
like the Green New Deal suggests that these proposals are not outlandish. 323
A universalist approach to distributive justice is the preferable one. Economists, agricultural experts, and others grappling with the issue of rural revitalization are often flummoxed by tailored approaches. Federal transitional policies
geared toward addressing rural displacement have not been particularly successful. 324 The vastness of the crumbling rural infrastructure is overwhelming. 325
Dead industries are unlikely to be revived, and nor should they be in most cases.
Tinkering to find the perfect revitalization policy or public-private partnership faces a profound uphill battle to fix large-scale rural decline and
longstanding under-investment. 326 Some success stories exist. But quick fixes—such as “teaching coal miners to code,” “investing in microbreweries,” or
“having them grow hemp”—discount the complexity of this issue while also
disregarding the preferences and capabilities of locals. 327 Perhaps it should be
recognized that the private sector simply is not the solution here, and for good
reason. The law has empowered the private sector so robustly, and it has
wronged rural communities so dramatically, pursuing corporate incentives or
benevolence to “save” rural America would merely be sending rural communities back into the lion’s den.
Of course, some might observe that many rural residents would not vote
for these measures or the politicians that support them. These skeptics might
also point to the fact that rural residents have disproportionate voting power,
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suggesting that they are not in need of advocacy. 328 This tension is admittedly
complex; it is presumed that disproportionate rural representation in legislatures is problematic. Although this question is outside the scope of this paper,
as noted above, this stance discounts rural minorities who do not vote for conservatives. Further, this disproportionate power does not square with rural
communities’ disproportionately low per capita resources, higher rates of persistent poverty, and limited access to basic services, such as broadband,
schools, doctors, and lawyers. 329 It is true that many rural residents would disagree with the recommendations presented in this Article and make those sentiments known at the voting booth. But it is not true that someone who opposes
subsidized healthcare deserves to go bankrupt because of medical expenses, or
that someone who supports coal mining deserves to die from black lung. This
Article does not ask what some rural residents would vote for; rather, it asks
what is just.
As an alternative or complement to a universalist approach, remedies tailored to rural conditions may also make a difference. Yet, even a more tailored
approach would require redirecting more resources toward rural communities
to address their basic needs. Rural residents are literally and urgently unsafe in
light of closures of hospitals and police departments stemming from drops in
local tax coffers; states should intervene to provide these needed services.330 At
a somewhat less immediate level, communities in decline can be helped to decline with dignity. Communities that stand to be revitalized may benefit from
resources strategically geared toward economic diversification. Both types of
communities would benefit from efforts to address the country’s aging infrastructure, for which federal precedent does exist.331 Limits on corporate power
to use land and people with impunity would also help empower rural workers
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See Bassett, supra note 124, at 743 (discussing stereotypes about rural voters—such as: (1)
“[r]ural dwellers are thought to live in peaceful idyllic settings where issues are simple and unproblematic”; (2) it is believed that the “political interests of rural dwellers are more fully protected than
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329
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large part because of campaign financing); Pruitt & Showman, supra note 42 (discussing rural residents’ difficulties accessing basic services); Robin Runge & Christyne J. Vachon, Planting the Seeds
and Getting into the Field: The Role of Law Schools in Ensuring Access to Justice in Rural Communities, 59 S.D. L. REV. 616 (2014) (arguing that lawyers and the legal profession dedicate less energy
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and communities to better protect themselves and ensure a more just distribution of burdens and benefits. 332
In either case, though, it must be understood that rural communities cannot, ethically and practically, be left to rectify their plight alone. The distributive justice critique presented above demonstrates that this problem is a collective one. Public decisionmakers have failed to address persistent rural poverty.
Their actions have sacrificed rural communities that are declining in the name
of aggregate benefits. It is thus now these decisionmakers’ task to rectify rural
distributive injustice. Even if one is skeptical of the moral case for rural salvation, the practical one still reigns because urban communities depend so heavily on rural productive activities, and because of the threats to stability that unjust transitions have wielded. Thus, no matter what the precise path toward the
outcome may be, this Article necessarily implies that a fairer proportion of resources and protections must be directed toward rural communities.
CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to answer the questions, “What happened to rural
America and what should be done about it?” because current public and scholarly discussions are failing to. Common answers are that “rural America died”
and “it is unclear that anything can be done.” These answers are inadequate.
Allowing chronic rural poverty to continue is a political choice. For communities in decline, they did not “die”; decades of knowing law and policy decisions made rural people and places worse off in the name of collective benefits, including cheap energy, clean energy, cheap and abundant food, cheap
goods, and a higher GDP. These decisions effectuated distributive injustice
through political institutions, concentrating burdens on a sacrificial population
in the name of collective gain. This distributive injustice became layered atop
the more glaring substantive distributive injustice that also shapes rural communities, including the law’s inequitable allocations of resources and persistent
poverty that fall harder on the shoulders of rural communities of color.
These problems are not unsolvable, however. A more equitable allocation
of resources and protections to all marginalized populations would go far to
rectifying rural inequity. So, too, would tailored approaches that do more to
address the distinct forces that created today’s rural conditions. In any case,
whether it is for reasons of human compassion, public complicity, or a pragmatic concern for food and energy provision, rural challenges are not just a
“rural problem”—they are everyone’s problem.
332
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